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Introduction 
In the l a s t  decade the socia l  sciences have turned with enthusiasm t o  h i s to ry ,  
In anthropology and economics a s  in  sociology and p o l i t i c a l  science, much of the  best  
work s tud ies  data from the past  or evolves methods fo r  examining social  processes 
over time. Yet the fundamental i ssues  t h a t  have troubled socia l  science thinking 
since its inception seem.strangely unchanged by t h i s  "h i s to r ic  turn." To be sure,  
we have recognized tha t  a l ink l i k e  t h a t  between soc ia l  c l a s s  and revolution changes 
h i s to r i ca l l y .  And t h i s  has allowed us t.o see  tha t  causal propositions--the syntax of 
soc i a l  life--must vary with time. B u t  we have been l e s s  quick t o  examine how our 
theore t ica l  semantics--terms l i k e  "agency" and "actionqq--and our very epietemological 
foundations themselves have a his tory,  a his tory not of refinement t.owards grea te r  
t r u t h ,  but rather of undending contest ,  a h i s to ry  not unlike those we study. 
Appreciating t h i s  deeper epistemological potent ia l  of history demands an 
"h i s to r ica l  and narra t ive  e p i s t e m ~ l o g y . ~ ~  This is a way of investigating sociological  
problems founded on the  pr inciple  t ha t  a l l  our knowledge, our logics, our theor ies ,  
and our reasoning pract.ices a r e  "history-laden," Hist.orlcizing these pract ices  by 
looking c losely  a t  t h e i r  rootednees i n  what. I w i l l  be ca l l i ng  "knowledge cul tures"  
may begin t o  e f f ec t  some deeper changes on sociology a s  a whole. This is the task of 
an h i s to r i ca l  epistemology. I t  i s  an epistemology applying equal ly , to  the  h i s to r i ca l  
recounting of past  par t i cu la rs  and t.o t h e  sociological  theorizing of past  and present 
genera l i t i es .  And i t  is  most notably an epistemology singularly unconcerned with 
d i sc ip l inary  boundaries. 
My c h i e f  aim i n  t h i s  paper  i s  e x p l o r e  t h e  impact o f  s o c i o l o g y ' s  r e c e n t  " h i s t o r i c  
t u r n "  on o u r  p r a c t i c e s  and c o n v i c t i o n s  a b o u t  a )  how t o  make knowledge abou t  b o t h  b )  
what is t h e  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y  and c )  - why s o c i a l  p r o c e s s e s  happen i n  t h e  ways t h e y  do.  
I w i l l  d o  t h i s  by l o o k i n g  a t  some of s o c i o l o g y ' s  fundamental  c o n t r o v e r s i e s  b e f o r e  and 
a f t e r  t h e  h i s t o r i c  t u r n .  Fol lowing i n  t h e  i r r e v e r e n t  t r a d i t i o n  o f  Bar r ing ton  Moore, 
I am a s k i n g  -- s o  what? What d i f f e r e n c e  h a s  it made?l More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  what h a s  
been t h e  impact  of t h e  encounte r  w i t h  h i s t o r y  on ways we t r y  t o  unders tand  t h e  s o c i a l  
wor ld?  E v a l u a t i v e  q u e s t i o n s  s h o u l d  be  posed on b o t h  s u b s t a n t i v e  and t h e o r e t i c a l  
c r i t e r i a .  The former  a s k s  abou t  t h e  s u b s t a n t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  o f  t h e  f o c u s  on 
h i s t o r i c a l  t o p i c s :  Have h i s t o r i c a l  s t u d i e s  on,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e  d i v i s i o n  of l a b o u r  
i n  1 9 t h  c e n t u r y  E n g l i s h  f a c t o r i e s  enhanced o u r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of t h e  s o c i a l  b a s i s  o f  
g e n d e r  i n e q u a l i t y ?  The l a t t e r  c r i t e r i a  a r e  " m e t a t h e o r i c a l . "  I c o u l d  j u s t  a s  w e l l  
u s e  t h e  word " p h i l o s o p h i c a l "  (and w i l l ,  i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y . )  E i t h e r  term is  used s imply 
t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  between two d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c t s  of s o c i a l  i n q u i r y .  On t h e  one s i d e  is  
m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l  i n q u i r y ,  which r e f l e c t s  on how and why s o c i o l o g y  u s e s  c e r t a i n  
s t a n d a r d s  t o  c o n s t r u c t  s o c i a l  knowledge i n  g e n e r a l .  And on t h e  o t h e r  is  e x p l a n a t o r y  
i n q u i r y ,  which s e e k s  t o  d e v e l o p  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e o r i e s  abou t  s u b s t a n t i v e  top ics - -  
t h e o r i e s  o f  p u b l i c  o p i n i o n ,  f o r  example,  o r  o f  c l a s s  fo rmat ion .  
Using m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l  c r i t e r i a ,  one would want t o  a s k  q u e s t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  
h i s t o r i c  t u r n ' s  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h r e e  e s s e n t i a l  areas--1)  t o  o u r  ways of 
c o n s t r u c t i n g  and e s t a b l i s h i n g  knowledge a b o u t  s o c i e t y ;  2 )  t o  o u r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  of t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y  and s o c i a l  b e i n g s ;  and 3 )  t o  t h e  v a l i d i t y  of t h e  s p e c i f i c  ways we ---- 
u s e  t o  e x p l a i n  s o c i a l  outcomes and p r o c e s s e s .  These a r e  t h r e e  o f  t h e  most d e e p l y  - --. 
d i v i s i v e  problems i n  s o c i o l o g y  and t h e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s  a s  a  whole. They r e p r e s e n t  
f i r s t ,  i s s u e s  o f  =istemology, --- which a d d r e s s e s  t h e  problem of  how we can b e l i e v e  we 
r e a l l y  - know about  t h e  world ,  and why we b e l i e v e  i n  t h e s e  f o u n d a t i o n s  f o r  knowledge. 
I w i l l  c a l l  t h i s  t h e  problem of  "ways of knowing." The second r e p r e s e n t s  i s s u e s  of 
s o c i a l  o n t o l o g y  ( i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  t h e  term can  be used i n t e r c h a n g e a b l y  w i t h  s o c i a l  o r  -- --- 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  a n t h r o p o l o g y ) ,  which a d d r e s s e s  t h e  problem n o t  of how t o  know about  
s o c i e t y ,  b u t  o f  what a c t z l y  is  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i a l  r e a l i t y :  What - i s  s o c i e t y ?  What 
is a  s o c i a l  a c t o r ?  I w i l l  c a l l t h i s  t h e  problem of  "ways o f  be ing . "  And t h e  t h i r d  -- 
r e p r e s e n t s  i s s u e s  of methodology, which a d d r e s s e s  v i a b i l i t y  of d i f f e r e n t  e x p l a n a t o r y  ----- -- 
s t r a t e g i e s .  I w i l l  c a l l  t h i s  t h e  problem of  "ways o f  e x p l a i n i n g . "  
The b u l k  o f  t h i s  paper  w i l l  f o c u s  on t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between h i s t o r i c a l  -
s o c i o l o g y  and t h e s e  t h r e e  s o c i o l o g i c a l  problems a b o u t  how t o  know (epis temology)  
a b o u t  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  s o c i e t y  ( b e i n g )  and how t o  make s e n s e  o f  i t  ( e x p l a i n i n g . )  
R e g a r d l e s s  o f  whether  we d e a l  e x p l i c i t l y  t h e s e  t h r e e  problems, t h e y  a r e  t h e  
f o u n d a t i o n a l  a n d . c o n t e s t e d  " f a u l t - l i n e s "  o f  t h e  h i s t o r i c  t u r n .  Ques t ions  about. t h i s  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  would i n c l u d e :  Has t h e r e  been an e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  i n  o u r  
t h i n k i n g  a b o u t  t h e  s o c i a l  world a s  s c h o l a r s  have b o l d l y  t r a n s g r e s s e d  d i s c i p l i n a r y  
b o u n d a r i e s ?  How s i g n i f i c a n t  h a s  h i s t o r i c a l  work been t o  t h e  g e n e r a l  a r e a  of s o c i a l  
t h e o r y ?  Has any consensus  been ach ieved  o v e r  whether  t h e r e  a r e  c e n t r a l  problems 
u n i f y i n g  t h e  concerns  of t h o s e  who work a t  t h e  b o u n d a r i e s  of h i s t o r y  and s o c i o l o g y ?  
A r e  t h e  p r o b l e m s , o f  each  d i s c i p l i n e  s imply  e x p o r t e d  o n t o  new t e r r i t o r y  i n  t h e  
i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y  e n c o u n t e r ,  o r  d o e s  t h e  h i s t o r i c  t u r n  p r o v i d e  e x p l a n a t o r y  t o o l s  
p r e v i o u s l y  u n a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  s i n g l e  d i s c i p l i n a r y  approach? 
The s t o r y  o f  s o c i o l o g y ' s  h i s t o r i c  t u r n  s u g g e s t s  why b o t h  t h e s e  c r i t e r i a - -  
s u b s t a n t i v e  and p h i l o s o p h i c a l - - a r e  impor tan t .  H i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g y  began t o  reemerge 
i n  t h e  1 9 6 0 ' s  w i t h  t h e  p e r c e i v e d  i n t e r e l a t i o n s h i p  between a  s u b s t a n t i v e  conserva t i sm 
( e s p e c i a l l y  modern iza t ion  t h e o r y )  and t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  methodologies  o f  mains t ra im 
s o c i o l o g y .  The i n t e l l e c t u a l  i n s p i r a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  view was above a l l  C.W. M i l l s . 2  
M i l l s ' s  d e f i n i t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  was t o  have l i n k e d  t o g e t h e r  s u b s t a n c e  and 
ep i s temolgy .  He d i d  t h i s  by c r i t i c i z i n g  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  " r a d i c a l  
empiricism" and "grand theory" alike but, most importantly, by demonstrating how 
these implications were inseparable from sociology's anti-historicalism.3 At the 
same time the activism of the 1960's inspired general i~erest in the topics of 
social change, revolution, and class analysis. Hardly new of course, these topics 
were central to modernization studies--arguably the most prestigious area of the 
social and political sciences in the 1950's and 60's.4 But what made the difference 
was a snowballing awareness of the link between the conservatism of modernization 
theory and the recognition that its approach was deeply anti-historical. It was this 
that sparked a sudden sense of urgency about the need to develop historical 
methodologies for macrosociological analysis. In this respect Barrington Moore's 
comparative historical analysis of the varying routes to the ''modern world" truly set 
the terms for sociology's recent historic turn--the emphasis on macrostructural and 
class transformation, and what Skocpol and I later called his "macroanalytic" 
comparative historical methodology. And these have continued to be the terms for 
both the developments as well as the criticisms that have characterized the sub-field 
of historical sociology.5 
~ u t  here is also a second reason why philosophical and metatheoretical criteria 
are essential that is at once analytically independent of this particular story and 
at the same time convincintly demonstrated by the story. It is not a very popular 
idea among most historical sociologists. This is that ideas about the nature of the 
social world, and about how to best gain knowledge about that nature, undergird the 
ways we go about explaining any given social process or issue. This first part is 
not .the one that most historical sociologists do not like; probably most agree with 
it. What is less popular are the implications of this: tha.t philosophy and 
metatheory -- matter because they have consequences for any and all sociological 
argument. And for this reason they cannot be simply ignored, dismissed, or "left to 
the metatheorists". I hope to make a case for these implicationsin this paper. To 
be clear, I am not suggesting they are the only things that matter, nor that they 
matter deterministically. But I am arguing that whether we are investigating love 
and emotions or demographic statistics we begin from philosophical ideas about the 
nature of the social world and our beliefs about what ways of investigating that 
world make the most sense to us. And this beginning point willy-nilly will be 
embedded in the answers with which we end. Whether there is inherent value in these 
issues (metatheory for metatheory's sake?) is an entirely different question. . Here, 
I introduce metatheory simply because it matters so much to what historical sociology 
creates. 
And the evaluation? Substantively, the sub-field has been an unqualified 
success. It would be hard to understate the importance of the last twenty five years 
ofhistorical sociology in enlarging our understanding of the social world. At the 
risk of doing a laundry list version of these gains, I think it adequate to simply 
asert that our understanding, indeed our awareness, of the historicity and variations 
in such areas as class and gender, revolutions and state-formation, religion and 
cultural identity, political economy and colonialism has been hugely enlarged by work 
in historical sociology. 
I do not believe the same can be said for our attempts to historicize the 
methodologies which inform our substantive analysis. We have a long way to go in 
changing, indeed challenging, the terms (and the stalemates) of the issues that 
fundamentally have divided the social sciences for over two centuries ago--the three 
problems of knowing, being, and explaining.6 Paradoxically, I believe this is 
because of the limited exploring we have done into the significance of histog -- 
itself--not as a subject matter but as an epistemology. In light of why the historic 
turn was originally sparked (the connection between substance and epistemology) it 
seems incumbent on us to push further into this potential significance through a 
direct confrontation between history and metatheory. 
I propose that we carry out this confrontation through the development and use 
of what I will call an historical epistemology. It may not be the only way, but it 
is surely one important way, to rethink the historicity of the historic turn. The 
approach rests on an undoubtedly contentious assumption, but one that nevertheless 
has emerged from my own work in historical sociology.7 This is that sociology's 
perduring philosophical fault-lines are built into the original social science 
project. They are the product of the fusion betweem a "revolutionary epistemology" 
on the one side, and an 18th and 19th century reading of contemporary history on the 
other. Sociology's philosophical foundations emerged from this particular rendering 
of a particular historical moment through a particular epistemological filter. That 
moment was the social drama of the macro-historical rupture between "tradition" and 
"modernity" as it was perceived by the historical sociologists who were the 18th and 
19th century's social theorists. The epistemological filter was the revolutionary 
social naturalism of 18th century combined with a revamped 17th century social 
ontology of the self. Classical modernization theory was both the outcome and the 
great and lasting invention of this complex fusion of history and epistemology. ~ o t  
merely one a number of subfields in social science, it is its virtual epicenter. 
Endowed with generality, this highly particularistic historical narrative was 
abstracted into the foundations of what we still know as social science. These 
foundations inevitably reflect the available analytic discourse of the then 
revolutionary epistemology; but their core consists of "frozen" fragments of that 
historical narrative distilled into theoretical presuppositions. 
.-h It follows from this that the historic turn and epistemology need each other. 
,-7 s .: \ . Historical sociology needs to further probe into the metatheoretical foundations of 
our substantive arguments. This probing, must not be solely philosophical. Instead 
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we must-recognize and so directly reconsider many of the same historical processes 
encoded in modern social science and theory. This historical task at the same time --
means experimenting with new conceptual schema~ critical of (or at least different 
from) the assumptions undergirding classical social theory. Since the historical and 
the conceptual tasks each presuppose the other, both must proceed at once. This is 
the challenge of an historical epistemology--to deconstruct and reconstruct the 
fusion of history and social theory. 
That, of course, is not the goal of this single paper! Rather, here I will use 
the idea of an historical epistemology in a more limited way: first to try to 
understand why historical sociology has not significantly transformed the terms of 
sociology's long-standing controversies and stalemates; and second, to make 
speculative suggestions about how an historical epistemology suggests new ways of 
thinking about these problems. The underlying theme of this paper follows from my 
experimenting with an historical epistemology. This is that social science and its 
internal hermeneutic critics is a way of thinking and reasoning about the social 
world. But it is just one way. For it is rooted in what I will call a knowledge -- 
culture, a term meant to suggest the historicity--and thus the contingency--~£ any 
given way of thinking and reasoning. This is not an argument from the field' of the 
sociology of knowledge, for a knowledge culture is not the surrounding "context" in 
which theories are born and so shaped. Nor is a knowledge culture is a specific set 
of beliefs or "truths." It is the actual practices of thinking and reasoning that 
constitute our full spectrum of conceptual and practical pos,sibilities. The 
historicity of a knowledge culture is thus constitutive to our very 
"presuppositional" categories and ways of reasoning. And because it is constitutive, 
this spectrum so ultimately delimits what is nonetheless a huge range of contestation 
about ways of knowing, being, and explaining. More important than any particular 
truth, a knowledge culture is constitutive to what even conceive of as possible 
candidates for being problematized as "true-or-false." .8 
It f o l l o w s  from t h i s  t h a t  t h e  f a u l t - l i n e s  o f  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  ought  t o  be  e x p l o r e d  
th rough  t h e  h i s t o r i c i t y  of i ts  knowledge c u l t u r e .  To do s o ,  I w i l l  look a t  t h r e e  
dimensions  t o  t h a t  c u i t u r e ,  a l l  which r e f l e c t  t h e  c e n t r a l i t y  of n a r r a t i v i t y  t o  
h i s t o r i c a l  epis temology.  The f i r s t  is t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  d i s c o v e r y ,  o r  how i s s u e s  a r e  -- 
"d i scovered"  and deemed p r o b l e m a t i c .  The s i g n i f i c a n c e  of d i s c o v e r y  is h idden  u n l e s s  
we look a t  knowledge c o n s t r u c t i o n  a s  a  n a r r a t i v e  p r o c e s s .  Discovery c o n s t i t u t e s  b o t h  
t h e  p r e h i s t o r y  o f  methodologies  on one s i d e  of t h i s  p r o c e s s ,  and t h e  c a r r i e r  o f  
o n t o l o g i c a l  n o t i o n s  of s o c i a l  an th ropo logy  on t h e  o t h e r .  I t  t h u s  forms a  c r u c i a l  
window i n t o  how w e  make s e n s e  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  world .  The second dimension i s  t h e  
spectrum o f  s p e c i f i c a l l y  o n t o l o g i c a l  b e l i e f s  which p recede  our  p r o b l e m a t i z i n g  a b o u t  
t h e  world .  How we presuppose t h e  . n a t u r e  of t h e  s o c i a l  world i s ' s h a p e d  by t h e  
h i s t o r i c i t y  and t h e  n a r r a t i v i t y  o f  o u r  knowledge c u l t u r e .  C l a s s i c a l  modern iza t ion  
t h e o r y  is  one o f  t h e  most powerful  n a r r a t i v e s  t h a t  h a s  informs o u r  range  o f  d e b a t e  
o v e r  o u r  p remises  a b o u t  s o c i e t y .  An h i s t o r i c a l  ep i s temology  can h e l p  u s  look  a t  t h e  
consequences  o f  t h a t  i m p a c t . b y  t h e  means of a  g e n e t i c  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e s e  o n t o l o g i e s .  
The term I u s e  f o r  t h i s  is  borrowed from t h e  p h i l o s o p h e r  of s c i e n c e  I a n  Hacking. It 
is  t h e  i m p e r a t i v e  t o  " t a k e  a  l o o k " 9 a t  t h e  h i s t o r i c i t y  o f  o u r  c a t e g o r i e s  and 
c o n s t r u c t s .  The t h i r d  dimension is t h a t  of t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n - - t h e  range  
of s p e c i f i c  methodologies  t h a t  a r e  l e g i t i m a t e  t o  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e .  I b e l i e v e  none o f  
t h e s e  methodologies  a r e  a d e q u a t e l y  h i s t o r i c a l - - t h e  h i s t o r i c  t u r n  n o t  w i t h s t a n d i n g .  
But e x p l a n a t i o n  can be p o t e n t i a l l y  h i s t o r i c i z e d  th rough  a  " n a r r a t i v e  c a u s a l i t y "  
c o n s t r u c t e d  on con t ingency ,  sequence ,  t e m p o r a l i t y ,  and meaning. 
P a r t  I of  t h i s  paper  examines t h e  r o o t s  and developments o f  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  l o g i c  
and i t s  c o n s t i t u t i v e  problems, t h e  ongoing d e b a t e s  o v e r  t h e s e  problems i n  p h i l o s o p h y  
and s o c i a l  s c i e n c e ,  and how t h e  r e c e n t  h i s t o r i c  t u r n s  i n  b o t h  f i e l d s  have a f f e c t e d  
t h e  t e rms  o f  d e b a t e .  P a r t  I1 is a  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  concep t  of a  knowledge c u l t u r e .  
It  forms a  b r i d g e  t o  P a r t  I11 where I w i l l  e x p l o r e  t h e  t h r e e  dimensions  of 
s o c i o l o g y ' s  knowledge c u l t u r e - - t h e  c o n t e x t s  of d i s c o v e r y ,  o n t o l o g y ,  and 
j u s t i f i c a t i ' o n .  My i n t e n t i o n  is n o t  t o  r e s o l v e  fundamental  debates-- indeed I d o  n o t  
b e l i e v e  " r e s o l u t i o n "  would be e i t h e r  p o s s i b l e  o r  an  i n t e l l e c t u a l  advance.  I d o  t h i n k  
it worth  w h i l e ,  however, t o  u s e . t h e s e  c o n t e s t e d  i s s u e s  a s  a  window i n t o  t h e  impact of 
t h e  h i s t o r i c  t u r n  i n  s o c i o l o g y  and a s  a  way of t h i n k i n g  a b o u t  t h e  p l a c e  of h i s t o r y  i n  
o u r  a t t e m p t s  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  s o c i a l  world .  The t e rms  I u s e  i n  t h i s  paper  a r e  j u s t  
tha t - - t e rms  t h a t  I u s e  knowing f u l l  w e l l  t h a t  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s  I propose  a r e  
s i m p l i f i e d  and a b s t r a c t .  Not everyone h a s  t a s t e  f o r  such  a b s t r a c t i o n s .  There  is no  
r e a s o n  t h e y  s h o u l d ,  and I c e r t a i n l y  d o  n o t  i n t e n d  t o  a r g u e  f o r  ( n o r  do I b e l i e v e  i n )  
t h e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of s o c i o l o g y  i n t o  ph i losophy .  But my m o t i v a t i o n  is  unabashed: it 
is t o  make a c a s e  a g a i n s t  an  a l l  t o o  common d i s m i s s a l  by h i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g i s t s  o f  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  i s s u e s  a s  mere "mere meta theory . "  
PART I 
S o c i a l  S c i e n c e  and its Dilemnas 
Like t h e  remarkable  f a b l e  t h a t  i n a u g u r a t e d  i t s  b i r t h ,  t h e  l o g i c  of modern s o c i a l  
s c i e n c e  is r a t h e r  s imple .  Both a r e  u t o p i a n  n a r r a t i v e s  o f  s o c i e t y ' s  emanc ipa t ion  from 
h i s t o r y .  Will iam Townsend, t h e  late e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  E n g l i s h  s t a t e s m a n  w r o t e  a  
s o c i a l  p a r a b l e  abou t  t h e  i s le  of  Juan  Fernandez (xxxx) .  The i s l a n d  (it had been made 
famous i n  England by t h e  m y t h i c a l  R. Crusoe) was popula ted  o n l y  by g o a t s  and dogs  
(men and women). According t o  r e i g n i n g  Hobbesian assumptions ,  t h e s e  a l l e g o r i c a l  
peop le  s h o u l d  have had b r u t i s h ,  n a s t y ,  and v e r y  s h o r t  l i v e s  i n  t h e  absence o f  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i t y .  Townsend, however, endowed t h e  i s l a n d  w i t h  n a t u r a l  harmony 
th rough  a  p e r f e c t  b a l a n c e  o f  p o p u l a t i o n  and food.  He d i d  n o t  e x p l a i n  t h i s  by what we 
might  today  i d e n t i f y  a s  an Orwel l i an  a l l e g o r y  i n  which o r d e r  is main ta ined  th rough  
b u r e a u c r a t i z a t i o n  o r  p o l i t i c a l  t y r a n n y .  Ra ther  t h e  f a b l e ' s  u top ian i sm was p r e c i s e l y  
i n  i ts  i n v e r s e  p o s t u l a t e :  no s t a t e  o r  a r t i f i c i a l  law was n e c e s s a r y  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h e  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  Townsend a rgued  t h i s  by borrowing a  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  new metaphysics-- the  
laws o f  nature--from a  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  new ep i s temology- -na tu ra l  s c i e n c e .  He combined 
t h e s e  i n t o  a  new s c i e n c e  o f  s o c i e t y  t o  c o n c e p t u a l l y  l i b e r a t e  t h e  s o c i a l  world from 
from p o l i t i c a l  o r  s o c i a l  a u t h o r i t y  and t h e  c l a i m ' s  of i t s  most a r t i c u l a t e  a p o l o g i s t s ,  
Hobbesian and Lockean p o l i t i c a l  t h e o r y .  T h i s  m i n i - s o c i e t y  f l o u r i s h e d  p r e c i s e l y  
because  it  was l e f t  t o  i t s  n a t u r a l  laws f r e e d  what he  viewed a s  t h e  c h a i n s  o f  
p o l i t i c s  and r e l i g i o n .  We were a b l e  t o  know t h e  t r u t h  abou t  t h i s  s o c i e t y  because  we 
had a c c e s s  t o  s c i e n t i f i c  f o u n d a t i o n s .  
C l a s s i c a l  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  was born  of t h i s  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  epis temology 
c o n s t r u c t e d  upon a  myth and a  metaphor abou t  a u n i f i e d  s o c i a l  sys tem w i t h  i t s  p a r t s  
e x p r e s s i v e  of a n  innerworking autonomous l o g i c .  S o c i a l  t h i n k e r s  o f  t h e  l a t e  
e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  a p p r o p r i a t e d  Townsend's a n t i - i n s t i t u t i o n a l  n a t u r a l i s m  a s  t h e  c o r e  
metaphor o f  a  new s c i e n c e  o f  s o c i e t y .  P r e v a i l i n g  Hobbesian assumpt ions  y i e l d e d  t o  a  
s o c i a l  u top ian i sm and r a d i c a l  n a t u r a l i s m :  f o r  Hobbes, s o c i e t y  needed a  s t a t e  because  
human were l i k e  b e a s t s ;  f o r  Townsend, it seems t h a t  n a t u r a l  law s u f f i c e d  because  
humans were b e a s t s .  L i b e r a t e d  from t h e  burdensome t r a d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  p a s t - - e l e g a n t  i n  
i t s  pars imonious  s i m p l i c i t y - - t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  s c i e n c e  o f  " s o c i e t y "  had a r r i v e d . 1 0  
Perhaps  i n e v i t a b l y ,  two g r e a t  problems were b u i l t  i n t o  t h i s  n a t u r a l i s t i c  
metaphor and i t s  s c i e n t i f i c  founda t ions - - the  problem of knowing and t h e  problem of 
be ing .  The f i r s t  h inged on t h e  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  o f  a  s c i e n t i f i c  l o g i c  a s  t h e  grounds 
f o r  o u r  knowledge a b o u t  t h e  s o c i a l  world.  I f  s c i e n c e  is  t h e  c r i t e r i a  f o r  knowledge, 
and s c i e n c e  i s  a  method of " d i s c o v e r i n g "  o b j e c t i v e  laws o f  n a t u r e  (now o f  s o c i e t y )  
t h a t  e x i s t  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  us - -unaf fec ted  by o u r  i d e a s  a b o u t  them, u n a f f e c t e d  by o u r  
b e i n g  humans--where d o e s  t h e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  human u n d e r s t a n d i n g  ( v e r s t e h e n )  f i t  i n  t o  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  knowledge? Does it make a d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  t h e  s u b j e c t s  a r e  humans, not.. 
o b j e c t s ,  and t h u s  t h e y  have c o n s c i o u s n e s s ?  Should t h i s  n o t  a f f e c t  o u r  method f o r  
o b t a i n i n g  knowledge? What a b o u t  t h e  s o c i o l o g i s t s ' s  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  and t h e  c a p a c i t y  t o  
empathize--as f e l l o w  humans--with t h e  s u b j e c t s  of o u r  i n q u i r y ?  What abou t  t h e  
c a p a c i t y  t o  d i s c e r n  meaning, n o t  j u s t  b e h a v i o r ?  These were a r e  a l l  problems of t h e  
-.- -
f o u n d a t i o n s  f o r  s o c i a l  knowledge. 
The second problem is on to log ica l - -What i s  s o c i e t y ?  b )  What is a  s o c i a l  a c t o r ?  
The problem was how o r  even whether  t h i s  s y s t e m i c  n o t i o n  o f  s o c i e t y  cou ld  be  
r e c o n c i l e d  w i t h  an  an th ropo logy  t h a t  i n c l u d e d  moral  agency r a t h e r  t h a n  mere 
b e h a v i o r a l i s m ,  and i n d i v i d u a l i s m  a s  w e l l  a s  s o c i a l  wholism. I f  s o c i e t y  made up of 
humans, and humans have f r e e  w i l l  t o  a c t ,  how is  t h e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  agency accounted 
f o r ?  I f  s o c i e t y  i s  a  s y s t e m i c  s t r u c t u r e ,  where how d o e s  a c t i o n  f i t  i n ?  Devised t o  
s o l v e  t h e  problem of  how t h e r e  c o u l d  be any o r d e r  i n  s o c i e t y  a t  a l l ,  t h e  s o l u t i o n  
c r e a t e d  a  more i n t r a c t a b l e  problem. Sociology has  been l e f t  fundamenta l ly  d i v i d e d  
o v e r  t h e  r e l a t i v e  impor t  o f  a c t i o n  and o r d e r .  
These problems of knowing and be ing  a r e  t h e  a x i a l  i s s u e s  of c o n t e s t a t i o n  i n  
s o c i o l o g y .  The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  impasse hinged upon a  fundamental  dua l i sm.  Should 
t h e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s  a d o p t  t h e  same s t a n d a r d s  o f  knowledge a s  t h e  n a t u r a l  s c i e n c e s ,  o r  
s h o u l d  s o c i a l  knowledge be  something a l t o g e t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  by v i r t u e  o f  t h e  
s u b j e c t i v i t y  u n i q u e l y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  t h e  o b j e c t  of s t u d y  i n  t h e  "human s c i e n c e s ? "  
I hope t o  show t h a t  t h i s  dichotomy l o o k s  t h e  way i t  d o e s  because  b o t h  s i d e s  of t h e  
d e b a t e  s h a r e  a c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  method--the one b e s t  r e p r e s e n t e d  by t h e  
"cover ing  law" p h i l o s o p h i e s  o f  Carnap,  Popper, and Hempel. The f o l l o w i n g  c o n v i c t i o n s  
f a l l  under  t h i s  r u b r i c :  1 )  n a t u r a l  s c i e n c e  l o g i c  is t h e  foungt ion  f o r  s o c i a l  
knowledge because  it can a t t a i n  t r u t h  th rough  a f u l l y  l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  u n a f f e c t e d  by 
h i s t o r i c a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e ;  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r  d a t a  may be  h i s t o r i c a l ,  b u t  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n s  
f o r  knowledae a r e  themse lves  o u t s i d e  of t ime;  2 )  t h e r e  is  no l o g i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  - - 
between t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  d i s c o v e r y  and t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n - - t h e  former is  
merely  a  c u r i o s i t y  w h i l e  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  t h e  grounds on which knowledge p r o d u c t i o n  - - 
s t a n d s ;  3 )  t h e r e  is a n  a b s o l u t e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between o b s e r v a t i o n  and t h e o r y ;  t h e o r i e s  
may.be used t o  f o r m u l a t e  c o n j e c t u r e s  (Popper)  b u t  o n l y  o b s e r v a t i o n s - - t h a t  which we 
can empirically contact--provide the foundations for knowledge; concomitantly, 
theoretical entities (electrons, social structure, the ego) do not exist since the 
only things we can truly know are those things we can observe; 4) causality and' 
explanation are not scientific concepts since they are not found in nature; an 
explanation can only be identified as such if logically deduced as a subset from a 
logical and predictive proposition using a priori rules; this is rarely possible to 
do since "causality" by itself is seen as local, not logical. 
Within this common rubric, two important distinctions exist in methodology: 
inductivist and deductivist logic. To the four points above Rudolph Carnap, the 
most important inductivist of the 20th century, added that the criteria for 
scientific knowledge were 1) the verifiability of propositions; 2) proceding from 
observation to generalization, and from these up to analogies, hypotheses and 
eventually testable theories.11 For Karl Popper, however, falsification was the 
justifiying criteria: a proposition was grounded only if it could prove to be false.12 
Popper also rejected Carnap's inductivism and argued instead for deductive logic--the 
process of conjecture and refutation: develop hypotheses, make deductions regarding 
causality derived from those propositions, test those deductions against 
observations.13 If they prove true, test some more; if they are false, revise or 
dispose of the hypothesis. Philosophers of the "historical sciences" engaged in 
parallel debates.14 Carl Hempel, the most notable, insisted that an historical 
explanation could only be justified if it was an instance of an a priori law that 
"covered" that case (Hempel, 1942). An explanation could have no logical autonomy, 
it had to be a subset of a conditional logical law although the methodology could be 
either deductive-nomological or inductive-statistica1.15 The same rules of a priori 
parallel logic, however, maintain for both.16 
The major hermeneutic counter-tradition can be traced to romanticism and most 
significantly to Dilthey and Weber who argued that the human sciences are 
constitutively different from natural science.17 In the 20th century Collingwood and 
Dray carried on the interpretavist tradition within the philosophy of history,l8 
while Hans Gadamer and Charles Taylor are probably most known among contemporary 
philosophers. All of these men argued that the human sciences must not only explain 
historical processes from the subjective understanding of the agents. They also 
insisted to varying extents on the methodology of verstehen and the significance of 
cultural anthropology.19 
Up until the time of the recent historic turn in philosophy and the philosophy 
of science, these are the dichotomous terms of the epistemological debate. To date, 
every advance in the defense of scientific logic--whether inductivist or deductive- 
nomological--has been matched by new innovations and defenses of the interpretive 
approach. It appears that the two positions are stalemated on first principles. But 
I want to argue that the stalemate actually rests on deeper agreements. First, in 
response to the two questions of justification--as to when a given set of 
propositions adequately explain why something happened; and when does a body of data 
confirm a proposition which can then be used to explain?--the covering law advocate 
makes explanation and confirmation a matter of general laws and a priori logical 
principles. The hermeneuticist also accepts and endorses this covering law model as 
both appropriate far and a correct definition of the natural sciences. This is t h e  - 
first point of agreement: that scientific knowledge is in fact founded on that which 
the covering law philosophers claim it to be. This may be more significant than the 
disagreement over the extension of the model to the human and social sciences.20 
The second point of agreement is deeper and more worrisome. Both approaches 
advocate generalizing and a priori rules of explanation once their respective -
criteria for truthful propositions have been fulfilled. For positivists this is more - 
obvious: a true hypothesis need only be analyzed logically in relationship to that 
wh,ich i s  t o  be e x p l a i n e d .  For t h e  h e r m e n e u t i c i s t s ,  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  is examined 
c l o s e l y  t o  d i s c e r n  whether  i t  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  test  of c e r t a i n  a  p r i o r i  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  and s u b j e c t i v i t y .  Both p o s i t i o n s  have f i x e d  s t a n d a r d s  of judgment 
which a r e  n o t  s u b j e c t e d  t o  e m p i r i c a l  r e f o r m u l a t i o n s . 2 1  A t h i r d  (seemingly 
p a r a d o x i c a l )  p o i n t  of agreement is  t h a t  b o t h  p o s i t i o n s  r e j e c t  c a u s a l  a n a l y s i s .  For 
t h e  c o v e r i n g  law p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  a s  I e x p l a i n e d  above ( i n  #4 of t h e i r  r u b r i c )  t h e  
reason  i s  t h a t  on i t s  own c a u s a l  e x p l a n a t i o n  is  t o o  h i s t o r i c a l ;  t o  be  j u s t i f i e d , ' i t  
must be l o g i c a l  deduct io;  o f  a  g e n e r a l  c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o p o s i t i o n .  For 
i n t e r p r e t a t i v i s t s ,  t h e  r e a s o n  i s  because  t h e y  a c c e p t  u n c r i t i c a l l y  t h e i r  opponen ts '  
r e d e f i n i t i o n  o f  c a u s e  a s  a  l o g i c a l  s u b s e t  o f  a  g e n e r a l  law. Cause, by t h i s  
d e f i n i t i o n ,  o f  c o u r s e  e x c l u d e s  t h e  c e n t r a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i v i s t  concerns--meaning, 
l o c a l i t y ,  and c o n t e x t u a l i t y - - a n d  s o  must be r e j e c t e d .  R e j e c t i n g  cause  a l t o g e t h e r ,  
however, is i t s e l f  p r o b l e m a t i c .  I n  i t s  e x p l i c i t  absence ,  i m p l i c i t  and ad hoc 
"causes"  i n e v i t a b l y  sneak i n t o  arguments.  And a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  t h e  vacuum l e f t  from 
t h e  e x p l i c i t  a n t i - c a u s a l i s m  i s  t o o  o f t e n  f i l l e d  by r e s i d u a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  c u l t u r a l  
s t a b i l i t y  t h a t  may a c t u a l l y  resemble t h e  l o g i c  o f  c o v e r i n g  laws.  Miss ing a  chance t o  
p o t e n t i a l l y  r e c l a i m  and r e d e f i n e  a l t o g e t h e r  c a u s a l  a n a l y s i s ,  it b e g i n s  t o  look l i k e  
b o t h  s i d e s  o f  t h e  dichotomy s h a r e  more than  a  d e g r e e  o f  a n t i - h i s t o r i c a l i s m .  
The H i s t o r i c  Turn i n  Ph i losophy  
Like a lmos t  e v e r y  o t h e r  d i s c i p l i n e ,  t h e  ph i losophy  of  s c i e n c e  and s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  
h a s  t a k e n  a  d r a m a t i c  " h i s t o r i c  t u r n "  i n  t h e  r e c e n t  decades .  I n  1960, Thomas Kuhn 
p u b l i s h e d  a book w i t h  a  now famous f i r s t  s e n t e n c e :  " H i s t o r y , i f  viewed a s  a  
r e p o s i t o r y  f o r  more t h a n  anecdo te  o r  chronology,  cou ld  produce a  d e c i s i v e  
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  i n  t h e  image of s c i e n c e  by which we a r e  now possessed."22 That  image, 
he a rgued ,  i s  f a l s e ;  i t  p r e s e n t s  a s  a b s o l u t e  and t i m e l e s s  i t s  f o u n d a t i o n s  f o r  
knowledge. He d i d  n o t  s u g g e s t  t h a t  s c i e n c e  p r e s e n t s  a s  a b s o l u t e  any p a r t i c u l a r  p i e c e  
of knowledge; b u t  t h a t  t h i s  an i n s t r u m e n t a l  problem o n l y .  I n  p r i n c i p l e  t h e  r i g h t  
method may u l t i m a t e l y  know t r u t h  s i n c e  our  f o u n d a t i o n s  a r e  n o t  h i s t o r i c a l  b u t  
l o g i c a l .  Among t h e  g a u n t l e t s  he threw down t o  t h e  c o v e r i n g  law p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  t h a t  
knowledge o n l y  e x i s t s  i n  t i m e  and is  h i s t o r i c a l  was Kuhn's most o v e r a r c h i n g .  T h i s  
a p p e a l  t o  h i s t o r i c i t y  a l s o  inc luded  t h e  c l a i m s  t h a t  a l l  d a t a  is  " theory-dr iven"  
( t h e r e  can be no f o o l p r o o f  d i s t i n c t i o n  between o b s e r v a t i o n  and t h e o r y ) ;  s c i e n c e  is 
n o t  c u m u l a t i v e l y  p r o g r e s s i v e ;  s c i e n c e  c o n s i s t s  of p a r a d i g m a t i c  "puzz le - so lv ing"  i n  
which t h e o r i e s  a r e  n o t  r e f u t e d  by anomal ies  b u t  r a t h e r  a d j u s t e d  f o r  "measurement 
problems";  and t h a t  s c i e n t i f i c  " p r o g r e s s "  o c c u r s  through p a r a d i g m a t i c  r e v o l u t i o n s  i n  
communities o f  s c i e n t i f i c  p r a c t i c t i o n e r s .  
The impact  of t h e  "Kuhnian r e v o l u t i o n "  was ca tac lysmic- -h i s  h i s t o r i c a l  c h a l l e n g e  
h a s  been one o f  t h e  most i n f l u e n t i a l  and c o n t r o v e r s i a l  t h e o r i e s  i n  20 th  c e n t u r y  
s c h o l a r s h i p :  S c i e n t i f i c  knowledge i s  n o t  r e f u t e d  by f a c t s  o r  anomal ies ;  h i s t o r i c a l  
and s o c i o l o g i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  de te rmine  t h e  l i f e  h i s t o r y  o f  a  paradigm. I t  was t h i s  
a s p e c t  o f  Kuhn's work t h a t  h a s  been most c r i t i c i z e d  f o r  i t s  r e l a t i v i s m .  He was 
accused  of a s c r i b i n g  i r r a t i o n a l i t y ,  r e l a t i v i s m ,  and "mob psychology" t o  t h e  
s c i e n t i f i c  community.23 Kuhn d i d  n o t  c o n s i d e r  h imse l f  " i r r a t i o n a l "  because  he  was 
n o t  q u e s t i o n i n g  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  concep t ion  o f  t h e o r y  i t s e l f .  Ra ther  he  was 
c h a l l e n g i n g  p o s i t i v i s t  n o t i o n s  of how and why t h e o r i e s  a r e  a c c e p t e d  o r  "d i sprovenW.24  
Nor d i d  he b e l i e v e  t h a t  because  t h e o r y  c o u l d n ' t  be s e p a r a t e d  from o b s e r v a t i o n  t h a t  
t h a t  made a l l  s c i e n t i f i c  o b s e r v a t i o n  u s e l e s s ,  l e t  a l o n e  s c i e n t i f i c  t h e o r i e s ,  any more 
t h a n  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l  d a t a ,  s a y ,  is theory-dr iven  makes a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l  
any  less i m p o r t a n t .  T h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  p l a c e  t o  d i s c u s s  t h e  Kuhnian deba te .25  I s imply 
want t o  emphasize t h o s e  f o u r  p o i n t s  of t h e  post-Kuhnian h i s t o r i c  t u r n  d i r e c t l y  
r e l e v a n t  t o  my d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  h i s t o r i c  t u r n  i n  s o c i o l o g y  ( h e r e  I am commiting a  
g r o s s  i n j u s t i c e  by c o n f l a t i n g  i n t o  a  s i n g l e  " h i s t o r i c  t u r n "  i n  s c i e n c e  and ph i losophy  
some of Kuhn's i d e a s  w i t h  t h o s e  of h i s  own post-Kuhnian c r i t i c s ) .  
1) Re: ways o f  knowing ( e p i s t e m o l o g y ) :  t h e  c u r r e n t  f o u n d a t i o n s  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  
knowledge a r e  h i s t o r i c a l  r a t h e r  than a s ign  of increas ing access t o  t r u t h .  2 )  Re: 
ways of being (ontology):  the  metaphysics of science a r e  a l s o  h i s t o r i c a l :  t h e o r e t i c a l  
e n t i t i t i e s  such a s  e l e c t r o n s  and quarks a r e  s o c i a l l y  constructed.  That d o e s n o t  mean -
t he  o b j e c t s  of physics a r e  h i s t o r i c a l l y  const i tuted--physical  e n t i t i e s  do e x i s t ,  
indeed long a f t e r  the  theory of e l e c t r o n s  has been surpassed,  supermarket doors w i l l  
s t i l l  be opening automat ica l ly  thanks t o  the  na tu ra l  force  the  concept of "e lec t ron"  
now represents .26 3)  Re: ways of knowing (again) :  knowledge const ruct ion  is a dual  
process:  the  context  of discovery--or how we ask ques t ions  about the  world--is 
inseparable from t h a t  of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 2 7  4 )  Re: ways of explaining (methodology): I 
a l s o  want t o  emphasize t h a t  which Kuhn and the  post-Kuhnians d id  no t  argue: t h a t  -
theory i t s e l f  must be h i s t o r i c a l  i n  method and c r i t e r i a ;  they d id  not  suggest  t h a t  an - 
adequate theory should be b u i l t  on a method t h a t  incorpora tes  time, contingency, 
sequence. Before I take up t h e  impl ica t ions  f o r  sociology of t h i s  h i s t o r i c  tu rn ,  l e t  
- me address t h a t  tu rn  i n  sociology. 
The His to r i c  Turn i n  Sociology 
One of the  hallmarks of the  recent  h i s t o r i c  tu rn  i n  sociology has been i t s  
r e f l e c t i o n s  on the  p r o j e c t  of cons t ruct ing  an h i s t o r i c a l  and comparative 
methodology.28 It i s  thus  a l l  the  more ind ica t ive  of j u s t  how stubborn a r e  t h e  
meta theore t ica l  impasses t o  note t h a t  the re  seems t o  be very l i t t l e  d i f f e rence  i n  the  
terms of epistemological  debate between sociology before  and a f t e r  the  h i s t o r i c  tu rn .  
Despite the  deepening of our knowledge of the  p a s t  we i n  h i s t o r i c a l  sociology have 
genera l ly  been caught i n  t h e  same dichotomies--only now exported on t o  h i s t o r i c a l  
da ta .  Consider f i r s t  "ways of being." Although h i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g i s t s  tend t o  
avoid e x p l i c i t  meta theore t ica l  i s sues ,  debate over the  r e l a t i v e  import of agency vs 
s t r u c t u r e  i n  expla in ing s o c i a l  processes is  always more o r  l e s s  impl ic i t .29  One of 
the  more prominent ones i s  t h a t  between B i l l  Sewell and Theda Skocpol i n  t h e i r  
discussion over the  French Revolution and t h e  d i spu te  over s t r u c t u r a l  vs agency- 
centered conceptions of socie ty .30  31 The burgeoning of new debate over the  
v i a b i l i t y  of r a t i o n a l  choice ana lys i s  among h i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g i s t s  ind ica tes  t h a t  
the  anthropology and ontology of the  both s o c i e t y  and the  s o c i a l  ac to r  v i r t u a l l y  not 
change i n  the  terms of debate s ince  t h e  o r i g i n a l  s o c i a l  sc ience  log ic :  Is soc ie ty  a 
systemic whole i r r e d u c i b l e  t o  i t s  a c t o r s ,  o r  is  s o c i e t y  an aggregate of individual  
ac t ions  o r  preferences? Is t h e  s o c i a l  a c t o r  cons t i tu ted  c o l l e c t i v e l y  o r  a s  an 
individual  who e n t e r s  i n t o  soc ie ty?  What is notable about these  d iscuss ions  is not 
t h e i r  lack of r e so lu t ion  i n  over  two cen tu r i e s  ( " reso lu t ion"  I would worry about)32 
Rather it is  t h a t  the  arguments and the  terms of opposi t ion a r e  the  same. When Marx 
wrote: "men make h i s t o r y  ... b u t  not  under the  condi t ions  they choose" he b r i l l i a n t l y  
summed up the  perduring on to log ica l  f a u l t - l i n e  of s o c i a l  science--before and s ince  
h i s  time. , 
But it is debates  over method t h a t  have predominated i n  h i s t o r i c a l  socio logica l  
discourse.  One way i n t o  the  terms of t h i s  debate is through a glance back a t  an 
a r t i c l e  Theda Skocpol and I wrote i n  1980.33 We suggested d is t inguished among th ree  
s t r a t e g i e s  of comparative h i s t o r i c a l  sociology: 1 )  " p a r a l l e l  comparisonsu--the use of 
comparisons t o  demonstrate repeatedly evidence f o r  a  general  theory (Wallerstein,  
Eisens tadt )  ; 2 )  "contrast-orientedn--the use of comparisons t o  h igh l igh t  the  unique 
and contextual ly  meaningful f e a t u r e s  of each case (Bendix, Geer tz ) ;  and 3)  "macro- 
analy t icoo-- the  use of comparisons t o  explain d i f f e r e n t  outcomes and r e g u l a r i t i e s  (B .  
Moore, Skocpol).34 Skocpol and I were e x p l i c i t  advocates of the  macro-analytic 
approach and it i s  t o  t h a t  pos i t ion  t h a t  most of the  c r i t i c i s m s  have been addressed. 
The f i r s t  s e t  of c r i t i c i s m s  came from the  log ic  of s t a t i s t i c a l  p robab i l i ty :  they 
re j ec ted  the  "imperfect empiricism" of the  macro-analytic approach--it s u f f e r s  from 
too small a  sample, and t o o  l a rge  a universe of p o t e n t i a l  independent var iables .35  
A few years  l a t e r  ( i n  defense of macroanalysis) I responded t h a t  the  problem i s  
not  t h a t  the  sample i s  too  small .  I t  is  t h a t  s ince  the  method c r e a t e s  causal  
configurations (comprised of different aspects of cases), even with a small number of 
cases the number of possible configurational "conjunctures" is potentially 
overwhelming.36 Indeed any loss in "scientific precision" is more than compensated 
by the greater intelligibility resulting from deeper subject-matter knowledge. By 
intelligible I meant meaningful, and used as an example Almond and Pie's comparisons 
of national pride. An abundance of precision, but little subject-matter knowledge, 
led them to conclude that Italians have a comparatively minimal sense of political 
identity--something.easily discounted by more contextual research.37 AS Geertz 
reminds us, a wink and a blink look the same out of context.38 
It is precisely this concern with context that motivates the second set of 
criticisms from the interpretativist position. Because they want to stress the 
particularities of and the meaning within each case, they reject the configurational 
strategy of macroanalyis. My response to this was there is no reason why meaning 
should suffer from this strategy. Indeed it is possible that this approach 
potentially could make culture and meaning more significant by identifying which 
specific aspects of a cultural and meaningful context can be more strongly linked 
than others to the patterns or outcomes under investigation.39 I suggested also that 
virtually all of the interpretavist tradition in historical sociology, moreover, 
rejects what they define as "causal analysis" in favor on using an ideal-typical 
methodology.40 As a result we end up with arguments about "deviations" from the 
(ahistorical) ideal-type rather than about variations. Just as philosophy has shown 
us the impossibility of "raw empiricism", we must similarly question the possibility 
of reconstructing any meaningful historical trajectories without the implicit or 
explicit use of explanatory argument. The problem is that the interpretativist 
historical sociologists accept and thus reject the covering-law definition of causal 
analysis .41 
Finally, and most recently Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter have issued an 
especially strong criticism from what would fit the "parallel" method in the Skocpol- 
Somers terminology.42 They argue that sociology is being undermined as serious 
theoretical research by the "empiricism" and "historicism" of historical sociology. 
Only deductivism can produce real theory (as opposed to "mere history") which they 
define as general covering laws which equally explain the past and predict the 
future. Explanation is thus entailed within the logic of parsimonious conditional 
propositions.43 
I have reviewed this methodological debate at length for several reasons. 
First, I wanted to observe that disagreements seem fundamentally untouched by the 
fact that the substantive content.of the scholarship is historical. Albeit in 
simplified form, the three approaches can nonetheless be identified as variants of 
the Popper-Carnap debate between deductivism (parallel comparisons) and inductivism 
(macro-analytic) on the covering law side, and interpretativism or hermeneutic 
sociology (contrast-oriented) on the other. Indeed they represent the same dividing 
lines that have marked discussion in the social sciences since its inception.44 
Consider the macro-analytic strategy: although using the adverb "analytic" and 
bearing few resemblances to Carnap, the method is a straight forward application of 
J. S. Mill 's inductivist methods of difference and similarity -45 Not surprisingly, 
it is similarly vulnerable to the same criticisms. The Kiser and Hechter position is 
an explicit recapitulation of Popper (with Lakatosian modifications) restating the 
case for primacy of a priori general theory and the subsumption of cause to an 
instance of the conditional proposition.46 And the contextualists make the 
hermeneutic rejection of causal analysis on the assumption that causality entails 
general laws and thus precludes meaning. 
Second, in my own response to the critics of macroanalysis it is notable and 
significant that each of my defenses entailed a move toward the third (previously 
Second, i n  my own r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  c r i t i c s  of m a c r o a n a l y s i s  it is n o t a b l e  and 
s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  e a c h  o f  my d e f e n s e s  e n t a i l e d  a  move toward t h e  t h i r d  ( p r e v i o u s l y  
r e j e c t e d )  p o s i t i o n .  Thus my r e p l y  t o  t h e  s t a t i s t i c i a n s  sounded s u s p i c i o u s l y  
i n t e r p r e t a t i v i s t ;  t o  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i v i s t s ,  s u s p i c i o u s l y  p o s i t i v i s t ;  and t o  t h e  
d e d u c t i v i s t s ,  s u s p i c i o u s l y  i n d u c t i v i s t  and i n t e r p r e t a t i v i s t .  T h i r d ,  I have wanted t o  
show t h a t  we i n  h i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g y  seem t o  have been s i n g u l a r l y  untouched by t h e  
h i s t o r i c  t u r n  i n  t h e  v e r y  exemplar  f o r  o u r  d i s c i p l i n e - - s c i e n c e  i t s e l f ! 4 7  
I t  would be wrong t o  s a y  t h a t  w e  have f a i l e d  a t  r e s o l v i n g  fundamental  i s s u e s  
s i n c e  " r e s o l u t i o n "  would n o t ,  i n  my mind, be a  s i g n  o f  s u c c e s s .  And it would be 
s i l l y  t o  u n d e r s t a t e  t h e  v a l u e  of t h e s e  c u r r e n t  methodolog ica l  d i s c u s s i o n s .  But i n  
l i g h t  o f  t h e  s t r i k i n g  c o n t i n u i t y  o f  theme--and it would be  p o s s i b l e  t o  document a 
p a r a l l e l  s e t  o f  d u a l  t r a c t s  f o r  t h e  i n t e r v e n i n g  y e a r s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  among European 
h i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g i s t s - - i n  P a r t s  I1 and 111, I w i l l  t r y  t o  answer t h e  one o v e r i d i n g  
q u e s t i o n  w i t h  which I a t  l e a s t  am l e f t :  
Where, a r e  t h e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  i d e n t i t y  c r i s e s  we i n  h i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g y  s h o u l d  
be hav ing?  
PART TWO 
Knowledge- c u l t u r e s :  t h e  h i s t o r i c i t y  o f  r e a s o n i n g  p r a c t i c e s  
Why, when we have t u r n e d  t o  h i s t o r y  i n  t h e  hopes  of working o u r  way o u t  of some 
of t h e  i n t r a c t a b l e  problems o f  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  l o g i c ,  have t h e  same fundamental  
o p p o s i t i o n s  o v e r  l a w s ,  r e a l i s m ,  c o n t e x t ,  c a u s a l i t y ,  v a r i a b l e s ,  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  a c t i o n  
and o r d e r  appeared n o n e t h e l e s s  doggedly? I d o n ' t  b e l i e v e  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  t h e  s t a l e m a t e  
is i n  t h e  s u p e r i o r i t y  o r  i n f e r i o r i t y  o f  e i t h e r  p o l e  of t h e  d icho tomies .  R a t h e r ,  i t  
l i e s  i n  o u r  common p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  a  knowledge c u l t u r e .  The f a u l t - l i n e s  and ---- 
problems e a c h  p o s i t i o n  a t t e m p t s  t o  s o l v e  a r e  n o t  independen t  o f  t h e  r e a s o n i n g  
p r o c e s s e s  w e  u s e  t o  t r y  t o  f i n d  s o l u t i o n s .  Both t h e  problems and o u r  r e a s o n i n g  a r e  
c o n s t i t u t i v e  t o  t h e  knowledge c u l t u r e  i n  which  we a l l  p a r t i c i p a t e .  So t o o ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  a r e  t h e  range  o f  p o s s i b l e  s o l u t i o n s .  A s  members of a  s h a r e d  c u l t u r e  o f  
r e a s o n i n g ,  o u r  a t t e m p t s  t o  s o l v e  i t s  i n t e r n a l  conundrums w i l l  r ep roduce  them, and i n  
d e f e n s e  o f  a  p o s i t i o n  on e i t h e r  s i d e  o f  t h e  d icho tomies  w i l l  move u s  o n l y  c l o s e r  t o  
t h e  o t h e r  s i d e .  To s u p p o r t  t h i s  argument i n  t h e  c a s e  of s o c i o l o g y ' s  h i s t o r i c  t u r n ,  I 
w i l l  f i r s t  more g e n e r a l l y  p r e s e n t  my view of  a  knowledge c u l t u r e .  
The r e s u r g e n c e  o f  s o c i a l  t h e o r y  h a s  been a n o t h e r  r e c e n t  t r e n d  among s o c i o l o g i s t s  
( indeed  t h e  growth o f  t h e  s o c i a l  t h e o r y  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  American S o c i o l o g i c a l  
A s s o c i a t i o n  has  ou tpaced  t h a t  of h i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g y  i n  less t h a n  f i v e  y e a r s . )  The 
t h e o r e t i c a l  r e v i v a l  h a s  produced a  renewed a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  and t h e  
o n t o l o g i c a l  f o u n d a t i o n s  of t h e  d i s c i p l i n e .  I n  a  h e a l t h y  r e s p o n s e  t o  what Alexander 
h a s  c a l l e d  t h e  " p o s i t i v i s t  p e r s u a s i o n "  i n  s o c i o l o g y ,  t h e o r i s t s  have t a k e n  on t h e  t a s k  
of " p o s t - p o s i t i v i s t "  s o c i o l o g y .  The problem, however, i s  t h a t  t h e y  have i n t e r p r e t e d  
p o s t - p o s i t i v i s t  ph i losophy  a s  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  o p p o s i t e  end o f  a n  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  
continuum between " theory-dr iven"  and "da ta -dr iven"  p o l e s  (see Alexander 1983) .  A s  
l o n g  a s  t h e s e  a r e  p e r c e i v e d  t o  be  t h e  pa ramete rs  o f  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  even a  d i r e c t  
c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i t h  meta theory  and ph i losophy  w i l l  n o t  e s c a p e  t h e  c i r c u l a r  d icho tomies  
o f  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e .  
Many s o c i a l  t h e o r i s t s  have w r e s t l e d  b r i l l i a n t l y ,  f o r  example,  w i t h  t h e  c h a l l e n g e  of 
r e c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g  t h e o r i e s  o f  a c t i o n  and o r d e r .  They most n o t a b l y  have a t t empted  t o  
escape  t h e  voluntarist...atructuralist dichotomy by d e v e l o p i n g  new concepts--  
s t r u c t u r a t i o n  and m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l i t y  a r e  two.48 The t h e o r i s t s  r i g h t l y  p o i n t  t o  t h e  
importance o f  " p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l "  c a t e g o r i e s .  But t h e i r  e f f o r t s  n o t  w i t h s t a n d i n g ,  i t  
is  n o t  ha rd  t o  r e c o g n i z e  t h e s e  t h e o r e t i c a l  a t t e m p t s  t o  once  a g a i n  be  v a r i a n t s  of "men 
make h i s t o r y  .... b u t "  
The s o c i a l  t h e o r i s t s  and t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g i s t s  a l i k e  need t o  fo l low t h e  
example of t h e  h i s t o r i c  t u r n  i n  s c i e n c e  i n  o r d e r  t o  s t e p  o u t  of o u r  c i r c u l a r  
arguments .  We must r e t h i n k  t h e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  p l a c e  of h i s t o r y .  
T h e o r i e s ,  e p i s t e m o l o g i e s ,  o n t o l o g i e s ,  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  a n t h r o p o l o g i e s ,  m e t a t h e o r i e s  
( i n c l u d i n g  m i n e ) ,  q u e s t i o n s ,  c o n c e p t u a l  frameworks, methodologies  and d a t a  always 
b e a r  w i t h i n  them t h e  s i g n a t u r e  o f  t h e i r  p a s s a g e s  th rough  t ime.  Both t h e o r y  and 
o b s e r v a t i o n ,  and e v e r y t h i n g  i n  between t h e  two p o l e s ,  is " h i s t o r y - l a d e n "  because  a l l  
t h i n k i n g  and a l l  r e a s o n i n g  p r a c t i c e s  and a l l  l o g i c  and a l l  r e s e a r c h  t a k e s  p l a c e  
w i t h i n  t i m e  and space .  The p a r a m e t e r s  o f  a  g i v e n  t i m e  and space  c o n s t i t u t e  a  
knowledge c u l t u r e .  A c l o s e  synonym is  what Hacking h a s  c a l l e d  a  " s t y l e  of reason ing"  - 
(a  t e r m  he  borrows from Crombie) b u t  i t  m i s s e s  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  and o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  
d imens ions  o f  a  c u l t u r a l  environment .  I u s e  t h e  term knowledge c u l t u r e  t o  mean an 
environment  w i t h  a  broad spectrum of c o n t e s t e d  t r u t h s  and f a l s e h o o d s  ( t h e o r i e s  o f  t h e  
wor ld ,  b e l i e f s  a b o u t  how t o  j u s t i f y  knowledge, problems-to-be-solved,  and s o  on)  
which is  n o n e t h e l e s s  d e l i m i t e d  by t h a t  c u l t u r e ' s  3 s  of  t h i n k i n g  and reason ing .  
These  p a r a m e t e r s  do n z s p e c i f y  a n y t h i n g  even s o  broad as " t r u t h . "  What t h e y  d o  
e s t a b l i s h  a r e  t h e  b o u n d a r i e s  o f  what is  even c o n c e i v a b l e  w i t h i n  o u r  h i s t o r i c a l  
i m a g i n a t i o n .  
A knowledge c u l t u r e  is b o t h  a  p a r t  o f  h i s t o r y ,  and h a s  a  h i s t o r y  (more l i k e l y ,  
many h i s t o r i e s . )  Var ious  ones  might  i n c l u d e  t h e  Greeks '  embeddedness i n  Euc l idean  
t h o u g h t ;  t h e  1 7 t h  c e n t u r y ' s  i n  e x p e r i m e n t a l  method; t h e  1 9 t h  c e n t u r y ' s  d i s c o v e r y  of 
s t a t i s t i c a l  r e a s o n i n g .  What b i n d s  t o g e t h e r  t h e s e  v a r i o u s  examples is n o t  t h a t  each 
one h a d - a  c e r t a i n  o r  even d i s t i n c t  n o t i o n  o f  t r u t h s ,  o r  s c i e n c e ,  o r  even 
methodolog ies  and e p i s t e m o l o g i e s .  Indeed e a c h  o f  t h o s e  would be h i g h l y  c o n t e s t e d  
w i t h i n  a  g iven  knowledge c u l t u r e .  Tha t  d o e s  mean t h e r e  might  n o t  be what Foucau l t  
h a s  c a l l e d  a  "regime of t r u t h "  domina t ing  a  p a r t i c u l a r  t ime  o r  p l a c e .  But t h a t  i s  
b o t h  an h i s t o r i c a l  and an e m p i r i c a l  q u e s t i o n  t o  b e  i n v e s t i g a t e d ;  it i s  n o t  
c o n s t i t u t i v e  of t h e  concep t  i t s e l f .  What is c o n s t i t u t i v e  of t h e  s i n g l e  concep t  is 
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a  spectrum of c o n c e p t u a l  and p r a c t i c a l  p o s s i b i l a - - w h i c h  
e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e  pa ramete rs  o f  what w i l l  even be a c a n d i d a t e  f o r  r e a s o n i n g  p r a c t i c e s  
a t  a l l .  A l l  knowledge c u l t u r e s  s h a r e  t h e  t r a i t  o f  b e i n g  l i m i t e d  o n l y  b y - t h e  v e r y  
range  o f  what i s  t o  be.  c o n s i d e r e d  a t  a l l  f o r  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  whether  "is it t r u e  o r  
f a l s e ? " .  O r  " s h a l l  we t e s t  t h i s  w i t h  s t a t i s t i c s  o r  f i e l d  work?" O r  " i s  t h e  modern 
s e l f  a n  a l i e n a t e d  autonomous s e l f ,  o r  a  communitarian one?"  Or t o  come a t  i t  from 
t h e  o t h e r  d i r e c t i o n ,  t h e  concep t  of a  knowledge c u l t u r e  h e l p s  u s  t o  unders tand  t h a t  
c e r t a i n  problems wouldn ' t  even e x i s t ,  and s o  would n o t  be s u b j e c t  t o  d e b a t e ,  i f  they  
were w i t h i n  a g i v e n  spectrum of reason ing .  T h i s  is what h i s t o r i c i z e s  o u r  thought .  
The i d e a  o f  a  knowledge c u l t u r e  and i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  p r o c e s s  can be  s e e n  i n  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  sequence (diagrammed n e x t  p a g e ) :  
1. Thought o p e r a t e s  w i t h i n  a  knowledge c u l t u r e - - a  way of t h i n k i n g  and reason ing  
t h a t  produces  a  c a p a c i o u s  b u t  d e l i m i t e d  spec t rum o f  c o n c e p t u a l  p o s s i b l i t i e s .  
Knowledge c u l t u r e s  a r e  p r o d u c t s  o f  h i s t o r y ;  e v e r y  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  c u l t u r e  is " h i s t o r y -  
l aden .  " 
2 .  The c o n c e p t u a l  i m a g i n a t i o n  is l i m i t e d  by t h ' i s  spectrum,  s o  t h e  range of 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n  a b o u t  o n t o l o g i e s ,  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  a n t h r o p o l o g i e s ,  even " r e a l i t y "  is 
h i s t o r i c a l l y  c o n t i n g e n t .  
3 .  T h i s  spectrum l i m i t s  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n  o f  p r o p o s i t i o n s  a b o u t  what may be 
t h o u g h t  a b o u t  a s  e i t h e r  t r u e - o r - f a l s e ,  and what c o n s t i t u t e s  a  q u e s t i o n  t o  be  asked.  
The range of what is  prob lemat ized  is t h u s  h i s t o r i c a l l y  c o n t i n g e n t .  
4 .  The range o f  p o s s i b l e  ways of e p l a i n i n g  problems and q u e s t i o n s  depends on a  
concep t  of e x p l a n a t i o n ;  e x p l a n a t i o n  t o o  is  t h u s  h i s t o r i c a l l y  c o n t i n g e n t .  
Before  s p e c i f y i n g  t h e  components o f  a  knowledge c u l t u r e ,  l e t  me f i r s t  be c a r e f u l  
t o  s.ay what I do n o t  mean by t h e  term. F i r s t ,  and f o r  s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s ,  a  knowledge 
c u l t u r e  is n o t  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  Kuhn's paradigm. Paradigms, a t  l e a s t  i n  Kuhn's model, 
a r e  t i g h t l y  c o h e r e n t  c o n s t e l l a t i o n s  o f  t h e o r i e s ,  methods,  and problems. T h i s  is t o o  
c o h e r e n t  t o  be  a u s e f u l  h i s t o r i c a l  t o o l  f o r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  e p i s t e m o l o g i e s  and s o c i a l  
o n t o l o g i e s  which a lways c u t  a c r o s s  numerous p a r t i c u l a r  t h e o r i e s  and methods. Within  
a g i v e n  knowledge c u l t u r e ,  p e o p l e  may vehemently a r g u e  abou t  what is t r u e  and indeed  
n e v e r  se t t l e  t h e  i s s u e .  These p e o p l e  a r e  u n l i k e l y  t o  work t o g e t h e r  i n  a t i g h t  
s c i e n t i f i c  community such  a s  t h o s e  t h a t  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  Kuhn's paradigms. T h a t  t h e y  
a g r e e ,  however, on t h o s e  t h i n g s  even t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  f o r  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t r u t h - o r -  
f a l s e n e s s  is because  t h e y  s h a r e  a knowledge c u l t u r e  and a spectrum of  c o n c e p t u a l  
p o s s s i b i l i t i e s .  J u s t  how c a p a c i o u s  is  t h a t  c u l t u r e ,  j u s t  how many r i v a l  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  t r u t h ,  c a n  c o e x i s t  may be unknowable. What w e  do know is t h a t  
t h e r e  a r e  c e r t a i n  t h i n g s  s i m p l y  n o t  i n  t h e  runn ing  i n  any g i v e n  knowledge c u l t u r e .  
A knowledge c u l t u r e  is a l s o  d i f f e r e n t  from Kuhn's n o t i o n  of paradigm i n  t h a t  
w h i l e  it c a n n o t  admi t  o f  f u t u r e  c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s ,  o r  even t h o s e  t h a t  a r e  p a r t  o f  
c o - e x i s t i n g  b u t  n e v e r  connec ted  knowledge c u l t u r e s ,  it is v e r y  much t i e d  up  w i t h  
p r e v i o u s  ones .  The p a s t  is n o t  a t  a l l  "incommensurable", i n  Kuhn's and F e y e r b a n d ' s  
e x p r e s s i o n .  F o r  a new knowledge c u l t u r e  t o  d e v e l o p  it must n o t  o n l y  have new and 
d i f f e r e n t  ways of t h i n k i n g  and r e a s o n i n g ;  i t  must a l s o  have a way o f  e x p l a i n i n g  b o t h  
t h e  o r i g i n a l  coherence and t h e  c u r r e n t  incoherence  o f  t h e  p r e v i o u s  ways of t h i n k i n g .  
For Kuhn, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  E i n s t e i n  is c l o s e r  t o  A r i s t o t l e  t h a n  t o  Newton because  of t h e  
f o r m e r ' s  o n t o l o g y  o f  mechanics.49 But i t  i s  f a r  more conv inc ing  t h a t  E i n s t e i n ' s  
t r iumph was t h a t  h e  p rov ided  a n  o n t o l o g y  which e x p l a i n e d  why "from t h e  s t a n d p o i n t  of 
an  approach t o  t r u t h "  Newtonian mechanics  is  s u p e r i o r  t o  A r i s t o t l i a n .  Why? Because 
r e g a r d l e s s  o f  how A r i s t o t l i a n i s m  might  have deve loped ,  it is v i r t u a l l y  i m p o s s i b l e  
t h a t  i ts  problems r e g a r d i n g  t i m e  would produce t h e  q u e s t i o n s  t o  which r e l a t i v i t y  is 
t h e  answer. A h i s t o r y  which moved "from A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m  d i r e c t l y  t o  r e l a t i v i s t i c  
p h y s i c s "  is  n o t  an " imaginab le  his tory ."SO P h y s i c s ,  l i k e  a l l  o t h e r  forms of t h e o r y  
and method and t r u t h ,  p r e s u p p o s e s  h i s t o r y .  Kuhn's h i s t o r i c i t y  is  l i m i t e d  t o  t h e  
s o c i o l o g i c a l  h i s t o r y  of any g i v e n  paradigm. We must look between paradigms f o r  more 
than  " incommensurabi l i ty"  and empty s p a c e  t o  make s e n s e  o f  thought .51 
To imagine any c o n c e p t u a l  schematas  a s  changing h i s t o r i c a l l y  t o  t h e  p o i n t  of 
incommensurab i l i ty  w i t h  t h e  p a s t  a l s o  assumes an  what I would deem an  u n t e n a b l e  
ontology--namely t h a t  any r e a s o n i n g  p r a c t i c e  cou ld  be  c o n t e x t - f r e e  enough t o  c a l l  
i n t o  q u e s t i o n  ,everything w i t h i n  i t s  own c u l t u r e .  T h i s  is  t h e  f i c t i o n  o f  D e s c a r t e s '  -- 
own s t o r y ;  i ts  a p p e a l  t o  u s  s t i l l  r e f l e c t s  t h e  a p p e a l  of i t s  u n d e r l y i n g  c o n c e p t i o n  of 
t h e  s e l f  a s  t o t a l l y  f r e e .  But w e  l e a r n  from Hume's own s t o r y  t h a t  s u c h  an  a t t e m p t  is 
t h e  i n g r e d i e n t  f o r  mental  breakdown, n o t  f o r  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  breakthrough.52 MacIntyre  
h a s  c l e v e r l y  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h i s  view of  o n t o l o g i c a l  a h i s t o r i c i t y  would make 
empir ic ism a d i s e a s e  and p a r a n o i a  a r e a s o n a b l e  epis temology,  s i n c e  o n l y  t h e  l a t t e r  
has  a c o n c e p t u a l  framework ( t h e  world  is  o u t  t o  g e t  me) th rough  which t o  e x p e r i e n c e  
t h a t  world .53 
A knowledge c u l t u r e  is a l s o  n o t  a form o f  l o g i c  l i k e  i n d u c t i o n - o r  d e d u c t i o n .  
m g i c  e n t a i l s  t h e  s k i l l  o f  jumping "from t r u t h  t o  t r u t h . "  54 Its' g o a l  is  t o  j u s t i f y  
a l r e a d y  e x t a n t  c l a s s e s  o f  p r o p o s i t i o n s .  A knowledge c u l t u r e  b r i n g s  i n t o  b e i n g  new 
c l a s s e s  w i t h i n  a new spectrum of  p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  o n t o l o g i e s ,  q u e s t i o n s ,  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  
And a knowledge c u l t u r e  is s i m i l a r l y  d i s t i n c t  from Laka tos '  " r e s e a r c h  programme" f o r  
it h a s  no s u b s t a n t i v e  "hard c o r e "  which p e r d u r e s  d e s p i t e  p e r i p h e r a l  c h a l l e n g e s  t o  t h e  
p e r i p h e r y .  A way of t h i n k i n g  and r e a s o n i n g  is a p r a c t i c e ,  n o t  an  argument,  and a 
p r a c t i c e  can e n t a i l  numerous s u b s t a n t i v e  even metaphys ica l  p r i n c i p l e s .  F i n a l l y ,  a 
knowledge c u l t u r e  is n o t  a s e t  o f  t r u t h s  and meanings which make two d i f f e r e n t  
c u l t u r e s  incommensurable u n t i l  w e  l e a r n  e a c h  o t h e r ' s  languages  o f  t r u t h  and meaning. 
To communicate o r  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  r e q u i r e s  n o t  a new vocabula ry  b u t  t o  u n d e r s t a n d ' t h e  
p r a c t i c e s  and p r o c e s s e s  o f  r e a s o n i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of a n o t h e r  c u l t u r e .  Thus 
t r a n s l a t i o n  is n o t  enough; and i t  is c o n c e i v a b l e  t h a t  r e a s o n i n g  p r a c t i c e s  can  b e  
s h a r e d  a c r o s s  d i f f e r e n t  c o n c e p t u a l  languages .  I n s t e a d  we would need t o  unders tand  
how it is t h a t  a n o t h e r  knowledge c u l t u r e  came t o  p r o b l e m a t i z e  t h a t  which t h e y  d i d  i n  
t h o s e  v o c a b u l a r i e s  t h e y  do u s e .  
A knowledge c u l t u r e  i s  t h u s  u l t i m a t e l y  n o t  a  p r a c t i c e  o f  r e a s o n i n g  d i s c r e t e  from 
t h e  world ,  one t h a t  c o n f r o n t s  d a t a  a s  something s e p a r a t e  and t h e n  p r o c e s s e s  t h a t  
d a t a .  I d o n ' t  know how t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between thought  and world a c t u a l l y  works, o r  
whether  t h e y  a r e  even two d i s t i n c t  e n t i t i e s  which can e n t e r  i n t o  a  r e l a t i o n s h i p . .  But 
t h e  concep t  o f  a  knowledge c u l t u r e  i s  meant t o  embody b o t h ;  t h e  world and a  
c u l t u r e ' s  r e a s o n i n g  p r a c t i c e s .  a r e  t o o  h i s t o r i c a l l y  in termeshed f o r  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l  
c o n c e p t i o n  o f  knowledge t o  b e  t e n a b l e .  T h i s  sequence o f  arguments a b o u t  t h e  
h i s t o r i c a l  con t ingency  of t h o u g h t ,  however, d o e s  n o t  mean w e  may n o t  have good 
r e a s o n s  f o r  hav ing  o u r  own s t a n d a r d s  of t r u t h  and reason .  To s a y  t h a t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  a spectrum of p o s s i b i l i t i e s  i s . h i s t o r i c a l l y  c o n t i n g e n t  is n o t  t o  s a y  t h a t  w i t h i n  
t h a t  many p r o p o s i t i o n s  may i n  f a c t  b e  deemed " t r u e "  on t h e  b a s i s  of ev idence .  What 
it d o e s  s u g g e s t  is c e r t a i n  d e g r e e  of a g n o s t i c i s m  concern ing  t h e i r  f o u n d a t i o n s .  
A knowledge c u l t u r e  makes ep i s temology  h i s t o r i c a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  e i t h e r  l o g i c a l  o r  
i n t e r p r e t a t i v i s t .  An h i s t o r i c a l  ep i s temology  i n  t u r n  e x p l a i n s  why t h e  spectrum o f  
c o n c e i v a b l e  o n t o l o g i e s ;  t h e  range of c o n c e i v a b l e  ques t ions - to -be  asked and problems- 
to-be  s o l v e d ;  and t h e  range  of p o s s i b l e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e o r i e s  and p r o p o s i t i o n s  
a r e  a l l  a l s o  h i s t o r i c a l l y  c o n t i n g e n t .  The con t ingency  is mutual a s  w e l l :  Hacking 
h a s  shown how t h e  emergence o f  s t a t i s t i c s  was t h e  r e s u l t  o f  q u e s t i o n s  peop le  came t o  
a s k  a t  a  p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e ,  o n l y  because  a t  t h a t  t i m e  t h e y  had s t a r t e d  t o  d e f i n e  
s o c i e t y  and t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i n  c e r t a i n  ways. And t h a t  t h e y  had done t h i s  was because  
o f  a s t y l e  of r e a s o n i n g  t h a t  had come i n t o  e x i s t e n c e  h i s t o r i c a l l y - - a n d  had n o t  been 
t h e r e  b e f o r e .  
The Knowledge C u l t u r e  o f  H i s t o r i c a l  Soc io logy  
I b e l i e v e  t h e  l i m i t s  t o  s o c i o l o g y ' s  h i s t o r i c  t u r n  a r e  t h e  l i m i t s  of  our  shared  
knowledge c u l t u r e .  T h i s  c l a i m  can be suppor ted  i n  s e v e r a l  ways, f i r s t  by n o t i c i n g  
t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  a t t e m p t s  t o  j o i n  methods s o  t h a t  a  " l i t t l e  meaning" is  combined w i t h  a  
" l i t t l e  s c i e n c e . "  T h i s  is  done s k i l l f u l l y ,  f o r  example, by C h a r l e s  Ragin i n  h i s  -- The 
Comparative Method.55 S i m i l a r  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n s  between a c t i o n  and o r d e r  a r e  e v i d e n t  
i n  t h e o r e t i c a l  d i<cuss ions  of s o c i a l  o n t o l o g i e s .  Hybrid t e rms  such  a s  s t r u c t u r a t i o n  
and m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l i t y  now c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  soc io logy .  
A second s u p p o r t  f o r  t h i s  c l a i m  f o r  a  common knowledge c u l t u r e  goes  back t o  an 
e a r l i e r  p o i n t  above: d e s p i t e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  and t h e  vehemence of o p p o s i t i o n ,  t h e r e  
a r e  fundamenta l ly  s h a r e d  assumpt ions  among t h e  p o s i t i o n s .  I have sugges ted  t h a t  t h e  
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  f o u n d a t i o n s  of b o t h  t h e  i n d u c t i v i s t  and d e d u c t i v i s t  v e r s i o n s  o f  t h e  
c o v e r i n g  law a s  w e l l  as t h e  he rmeneu t ic  t r a d i t i o n s  a r e  b o t h  a n t i - h i s t o r i c a l  i n  t h e i r  
o r i e n t a t i o n  toward a  p r i o r i  r u l e s  o f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  and t h e i r  mutual  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  
c a u s a l i t y  ( a s  d e f i n e d  by p o s i t i v i s m ) .  S i m i l a r  s h a r e d  assumpt ions  e x i s t  i n  t h e  d e b a t e s  
o v e r  o n t o l o g i e s  and ways o f  be ing .  R e g a r d l e s s  o f  which p o s i t i o n  one t a k e s  on t h e  
d e b a t e  o v e r  t h e  s e l f  f o r  example, communitarian and r a t i o n a l  a c t o r  p e r s p e c t i v e s  b o t h  
p resuppose  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an  e s s e n t i a l  human n a t u r e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  b o t h  p e r s p e c t i v e s  
on s o c i e t y - - t h e  a g g r e g a t i o n i s t  and t h e  w h o l i s t i c - - s h a r e  t h e  assumption t h a t  t h i s  
s o c i a l  e n t i t y  is a n a l y t i c a l l y  independen t  o f  i ts  s o c i a l  a g e n t s  and t h u s  can be 
r e p r e s e n t e d  a s  an  e n t i t y .  I n  b o t h  c a s e s  " s o c i e t y "  is a  s o c i a l  f a c t ,  n o t  an  
h i s t o r i c a l  one and t h e r e  is  a n  e s s e n t i a l  "something" o u t  t h e r e  t h a t  e x i s t s  p r i o r  t o  
o u r  c a t e g o r i z a t i o n  o f  i t - - r e g a r d l e s s  o f  whether  t h a t  t u r n s  o u t  t o  be meaning- 
c e n t e r e d ,  communal, i n d i v i d u a l i s t ,  and s o  on.56 I t  is  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t  I am n o t  
s a y i n g  whether  t h e s e  p o s i t i o n s  a r e  r i g h t  o r  wrong. What I am t r y i n g  t o  i n s i s t  upon 
is  t h e  common r e a s o n i n g  assumpt ions  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e  arguments .  
PART 111: TOWARD A NEW HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
I f  t h i s  argument f o r  t h e  i n h e r e n t  l i m i t a t i o n s  i n  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  l o g i c  and i t s  
a l t e r n a t i v e s  i s  a t  a l l  conv inc ing ,  how might  we b e g i n  t o  look d i f f e r e n t l y  a t  t h e  
i s s u e s  a t  s t a k e ?  How might  t h e  h i s t o r i c  t u r n  i n  s o c i o l o g y  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  l i m i t s  of  
i t s  own environment .  One answer t o  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  l i e s  i n  o u r  hav ing  a n o t h e r  look-- 
a l b e i t  a  c r i t i c a l  one--at  t h e  h i s t o r i c  t u r n  i n  t h e  v e r y  f i e l d  which h a s  been t h e  
model f o r  s o  many of  o u r  p e r s i s t e n t  conundrums, t h e  ph i losophy  of s c i e n c e  and even 
s c i e n c e  i t s e l f .  T h i s  h i s t o r i c  t u r n  d e s e r v e s  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  
s o c i o l o g i s t s .  It h a s  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  r e t h i n k i n g  o u r  most c o n t e s t e d  and s t u b b o r n  
problems of e x p l a n a t i o n ,  c o n f i r m a t i o n ,  and concep t  fo rmat ion .  To be  s u r e ,  t h e r e  a r e  
i m p o r t a n t  r e a s o n s  f o r  why we have n o t  thought  more a b o u t  t h e s e  i m p l i c a t i o n s . 5 7  What 
it h a s  done,  however, is p r o v i d e  i m p o r t a n t  c l u e s  which s u g g e s t  r i c h  o p p o r t u n i t i e s .  
There  is  much t o  b e  l e a r n e d  i n  l o o k i n g  a t  t h e  l e s s o n s ,  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  and t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  t h a t  h i s t o r i c  t u r n .  I have d w e l t  a t  l e n g t h  on t h e  f i r s t  o f  these--  
t h e  h i s t o r i c i t y  o f  any g i v e n  epis temology.  I n  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  paper  I w i l l  d i s c u s s  
t h e  remaining t h r e e :  1 )  t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  upon t h e  c e n t r a l i t y  o f  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  
d i s c o v e r y  a s  w e l l  a s  t h a t  o f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  t h e  importance of q u e s t i o n s ;  2 )  t h e  
r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  w h i l e  o b s e r v a t i o n  i s  thoery- laden ,  no l e s s  is meta theory  and 
o n t o l o g y  i t s e l f  h i s t o r i c a l l y  c o n s t i t u t e d ;  o u r  c o n c e p t u a l  vocabu la ry  o f  
" p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s "  is h i s t o r i c a l  and t h u s  a c t i o n  and o r d e r  a r e  n o t  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l ;  
we need a  new way of r e t h i n k i n g  o u r  c o n c e p t u a l  frameworks based on t h e  c e n t r a l i t y  o f  
h i s t o r y  and c u l t u r e  r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  autonomy of  e i t h e r  f a c t s  o r  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ;  and 
f i n a l l y  3 )  t h e  need t o  d e v e l o p  a c a u s a l  n a r r a t i v i t y - - a  rec la imed  n o t i o n  o f  c a u s a l i t y  
based  on n a r r a t i v i t y  and t h e  c e n t r a l i t y  o f  meaning, sequence land  con t ingency  r a t h e r  
t h a n  u n i v e r s a l i t y  and p r e d i c t i v e  law. 
C o n t e x t s  o f  Discovery  and J u s t i f i c a t i o n  
P h i l o s o p h e r s  of s c i e n c e  make a  fundamental  d i s t i n c t i o n  between t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  
d i s c o v e r y  and t h a t  o f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 5 8  It is  t h e  l a t t e r ,  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n ,  t h a t  most o f  u s  t h i n k  and worry a b o u t  most of t h e  time--namely, what 
b e s t  j u s t i f e s  and c o n f i r m s  o u r  t h e o r i e s .  How t o  d o  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e ?  V i r t u a l l y  t h e  
e n t i r e t y  o f  academic ire among s c i e n t i s t s  is e x e r c i s e d  o v e r  q u e s t i o n s  of v a l i d i t y ,  
v e r i f i c a t i o n ,  and j u s t i f i c a t i o n :  i s  it  r e a s o n a b l e ,  suppor ted  by ev idence ,  conf i rmed 
by exper iment ,  c o r r o b o r a t e d  by s t r i n g e n t  t e s t i n g ,  and s o  on.  We i n  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  
t h e n  go on t o  a r g u e  a b o u t  t h e  v a l u e  o f  q u a n t i t a t i v e  v e r s u s  q u a l i f t a t i v e  methods,  
s u r v e y  v e r s u s  h i s t o r i c a l  methods,  e t c .  The c o n t e x t  o f  d i s c o v e r y ,  by c o n t r a s t ,  is 
n e g l e c t e d .  It is t h e  c o n t e x t  i n  which w e  " d i s c o v e r "  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  we a s k  i n  our  
r e s e a r c h ,  i n  which we d e f i n e  t h a t  which is  c o n s i d e r e d  p r o b l e m a t i c  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e  
( o r  what is  n e c e s s a r y  t o  be e x p l a i n e d ) ,  and i n  which w e  s e l e c t  our  c o n c e p t u a l  
v o c a b u l a r y  t o  f o r m u l a t e  t h a t  q u e s t i o n .  Discovery t h u s  compr i ses  t h e  p r e - h i s t o r y  o f  
t h e o r y  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  
The c h i e f  r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  n e g l e c t  is t h a t  one o f  t h e  p i l l a r s  o f  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
t h i n k i n g  has  been t h e  i n s i s t e n c e  on a  r i g i d  s e p a r a t i o n  between d i s c o v e r y  and 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  Popper,  Carnap,  and Hempel a l i k e  charged  t h a t  t h e  c o n t e x t  of d i s c o v e r y  
had n o t h i n g  t o  d o  w i t h  what was a c t u a l l y  d i s c o v e r e d  and t o  t h i n k  o t h e r w i s e  was t o  
commit t h e  " g e n e t i c  f a l l a c y . "  Tha t  meant it  mixed up h i s t o r y  w i t h  s c i e n t i f i c  
l o g i c . 5 9  Q u e s t i o n s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  q u i r k y ,  o f t e n  born  o f  "mere c u r i o s i t y " ,  
s o c i o l o g i c a l ,  h i s t o r i c a l ,  o r  even p s y c h o l o g i c a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  (such a s  Kepple r ' s  sun- 
worsh ip ing  h a b i t s ) .  Because t h e y  emerge from i d i o s y n c h r a t i c  and p s y c h o l o g i c a l  
i n t e r e s t s ,  q u e s t i o n s  and c o n j e c t u r e s  c a n n o t  be l o c a t e d  a s  p a r t  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  
d i s c o u r s e .  To be s u r e ,  i f  n o t  f o r  K e p p l e r ' s  p e c u l i a r  committment t o  sun-worshipping 
we would n o t  have t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  e x p l a n a t i o n s  t h a t  we do have. But t h e  fundamental  
l o g i c  o f  K e p p l e r ' s  t h e o r y  is  untouched by t h e  f a c t  o f  i t s  o r i g i n s . 6 0  The randomness 
of i n t e r e s t  and i n t r i g u e  w i t h  mystery  c r e a t e s  an e q u a l  randomness i n  how we 
p r o b l e m a t i z e  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  w e  a sk  of t h e  wor ld ;  l o g i c ,  by c o n t r a s t ,  can n e v e r  be 
random. 
I t  was Collingwood who f i r s t  c h a l l e n g e d  t h i s  c l a i m  f o r  t h e  autonomy of 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  He a rgued  f o r  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  "quest ion-answer"  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between d i s c o v e r y  and j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i n  b o t h  s c i e n t i f i c  and s o c i a l  e x p l a n a t i o n .  He 
b e l i e v e d  t h a t  any a t t e m p t  a t  e m p i r i c a l  e x p l a n a t i o n  was doomed u n l e s s  we know what 
q u e s t i o n  we a r e  t r y i n g  t o  e x p l a i n ;  what it is t h a t  we a r e  a s k i n g  w i l l  de te rmine  where 
and how and on what grounds and w i t h  what e v i d e n c e  we look. f o r  an e x p l a n a t i o n .  J u s t  
a s  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  it w i l l  d e t e r m i n i n e  what we l e a v e  o u t  of t h e  e x p l a n a t o r y  i n q u i r y .  I n  
h i s  most famous example Collingwood d e m o n s t r a t e s  how a  g e n e r a l  q u e s t i o n  abou t  a  
s t a l l e d  car--"what i s  wrong w i t h  my car?"-- looks  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  answer we a r e  
most l i k e l y  t o  s t a t e  i n  t h e  a c t u a l  a t t e m p t  t o  g e t  t h e  c a r  started--"my spark  p l u g s  
a r e  f i n e . "  Tha t  answer,  he  p o i n t s  o u t ,  is a  r e s p o n s e  t o  a  more s p e c i f i c  ques t ion- -  
. . 
"are'my s p a r k  p l u g s  broken?"  I n  t h i s  l a t t e r  q u e s t i o n  hundreds  o f  o t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  
c a u s a l  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  indeed  n e g l e c t e d  b u t  it can  be  argued t h a t  t h e  answer is  a t  
l e a s t  " t r u e "  f o r  t h e  q u e s t i o n  and t h e  v a r i a b l e s  ( s p a r k  p l u g s )  a b o u t  which have been 
hypothes ized .  Collingwood used  t h i s  "question-answer" ep i s temology  t o  c h a l l e n g e  t h e  
r e a l i s t  argument t h a t  e x p l a n a t o r y  s t a t e m e n t s  e x i s t  o u t s i d e  o f  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  
p a r t i c u l a r  q u e s t i o n s . 6 1  
Kuhn gave a n  even more s e r i o u s  blow t o  t h e  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  d i s c o v e r y  from 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  from w i t h i n  t h e  h i s t o r y  of s c i e n c e  i t s e l f .  S i n c e  f o r  Kuhn s c i e n c e  i s  
i n  t i m e  and is e s s e n t i a l l y  h i s t o r i c a l ,  t h e r e  c o u l d  be no e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  s e p a r a t i o n  
o f  d i s c o v e r y  from j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  He a rgued  t h a t  s c i e n t i f i c  problems a r e  h a r d l y  
s e r e n d i p i t o u s .  R a t h e r  a  s t a n d a r d  s e t  of problems a r e  p a r t  o f  "normal s c i e n c e "  and 
come from paradigms. The c o n t e x t  of d i s c o v e r y  is t h u s  "paradigm-laden,"  accord ing  t o  
Kuhn, and it i s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  o f  a  paradigm t h a t  s p e c i f i e s  o u r  q u e s t i o n s .  And t h i s  
b r i n g s  u s  back t o  h i s t o r y  s i n c e  t h e  accep tance  and o v e r t u r n i n g  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  
paradigms,  t h e  n a r r a t i v e  of p a r a d i g m a t i c  change was of c o u r s e  t h e  c e n t r a l  f o c u s  of 
Kuhn's work on s c i e n t i f i c  r e v o l u t i o n s - - o r  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  c o n d i t i o n s  under  which 
paradigms a r e  over thrown and r e p l a c e d  by new ones .  
I n f l u e n c e d  by Kuhn b u t  want ing  t o  p r e s e r v e  Popper,  it was Imre Lakatos  who has 
p e r h a p s  most a c c u r a t e l y  e x p l a i n e d  why some q u e s t i o n s  a r e  asked and n o t  o t h e r s ,  indeed 
why s c i e n t i f i c  change is  s o  d i f f i c u l t .  Lakatos  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  p r o j e c t  n o t  
a s  a  paradigm b u t  a s  a  " r e s e a r c h  program" comprised of a  n e g a t i v e  and p o s i t i v e  
h e u r i s t i c .  The hard  c o r e  is n o t  open t o  d e b a t e ,  it t a k e s  on t h e  s t a t u s  of a  
metaphys ic ,  It  is  p r o t e c t e d  by a n  o u t e r  p r o t e c t i v e  b e l t  which is  open t o  new 
f o r m u l a t i o n s  and measurements. Although Lakatos  b e l i e v e s  s c i e n t i f i c  p r o g r e s s  i s  
about  t h e  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of t h e  a u x i l a r y ,  a  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  which d e v e l o p s  o u t  of new 
q u e s t i o n s  posed by anomal ies ,  h i s  d e s c r i p t i o n  more a c c u r a t e l y  e x p l a i n s  s o c i a l  
s c i e n t i f i c  s t a b i l i t y  and t h e  e x t r a o r d i n a r y  p e r d u r a b i l i t y  of s o  many of  our  "hard 
c o r e "  assumpt ions .  62 
Ques t ions  and h i s t o r i c a l  ep i s temology  
H i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g i s t s '  r e f l e c t i o n s  on t h e o r y  and method have been impoverished 
by t h e  s i n g u l a r  f o c u s  on j u s t i f i c a t i o n  and t h e  non- recogni t ion  o f  t h e  importance o f  
c o n t e x t  o f  d i s c o v e r y . 6 3  We have n o t  been e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s  enough 
a b o u t  t h i s  d u a l  n a t u r e  o f  t h e o r y  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  To be f a i r ,  we now know t h a t  thanks  
t o  Carnap and Popper t h e  d i s c o v e r y  p r o c e s s  was shun ted  o f f  as mere h i s t o r i c a l  
c u r i o s i t y  by pre-Kuhnian p h i l o s o p h e r s  a s  w e l l .  But we can ill a f f o r d  t o  reproduce 
t h i s  a n t i - h i s t o r i c a l  approach t o  t h e o r e t i c a l  development.  W e  must r ecognize  t h a t  
q u e s t i o n s  a r e  indeed  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y  p r i o r  t o  answers  and t h e y  c a n t  be t r e a t e d  a s  
r e s i d u a l s .  S i n c e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  is n o t  independent  of d i s c o v e r y ,  one impor tan t  avenue 
i n t o  t h i n k i n g  a b o u t  o u r  s tubborn  d e b a t e s  o v e r  method and j u s t i f i c a t i o n  is v i a  
q u e s t i o n s .  Here w e  have much t o  l e a r n  from s u r v e y  r e a s e a r c h e r s  such  a s  t h e  
p i o n e e r i n g  work o f  Howard Schuman.64 There  is  no s u c h  t h i n g  a s  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n  t h a t  
d o e s n ' t  c o n t a i n  w i t h i n  it a  p r i o r  q u e s t i o n ,  o r  what t h e  French c a l l  a 
"problemat ique."  The v e r y  language,  shape  and c o n t e n t  o f  o u r  e x p l a n a t i o n s  a r e  f o r g e d  
by t h e  q u e s t i o n s  which in form them: Indeed e x p l a n a t i o n s  a r e  o n l y  c a l l e d  i n t o  
e x i s t e n c e  by p r i o r  ques t ion ' s .65  
Our r e s e a r c h  agendas  a r e  t h u s  n o t  shaped by method and  d a t a  b u t  by t h e  
f o r m u l a t i o n  of t h e  problem t o  be e x p l a i n e d .  From t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e  it b e g i n s  t o  look  
l i k e  a t t e n d i n g  t o  q u e s t i o n s  w i l l  g i v e  u s  a  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  r o u t e  i n t o  t h i n k i n g  a b o u t  
t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  and t h e  dilemmas o f  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  logic--a  r o u t e  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  more h i s t o r i c a l  t h a n  th rough  d i r e c t  t h e o r e t i c a l  encounte r .  A t t e n t i o n  
t o  c o n t e x t  of d i s c o v e r y  w i l l  a l s o  l e a d  u s  t o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t  i s s u e s  of o n t o l o g y  and 
be ing ,  a c t i o n  and o r d e r .  For  a l t h o u g h  t h e  c o n n e c t i o n  o f  q u e s t i o n s  t o  answers  is more 
obv ious ,  what h a s  been unremarked upon is what I b e l i e v e  t o  b e  t h e  l i n k  on t h e  o t h e r  
s i d e  of q u e s t i o n - f o r m a t i o n ,  namely o u r  c o n c e p t u a l  frameworks. A f t e r  a l l ,  i f  
q u e s t i o n s  p recede  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  what p r e c e d e s  q u e s t i o n s ?  Where d o  q u e s t i o n s  come 
from? One r e c e n t  and conv inc ing  answer is t h a t  q u e s t i o n s  come from c i v i l i z a t i o n a l  
c o n c e r n s  ( Z a l d ) .  I t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  is v e r y  much t h e  c a s e ,  b u t  th rough  a  r a t h e r  more 
i n d i r e c t  r o u t e  t h a n  t h i s  argument s u g g e s t s .  
Q u e s t i o n s  a r e  born  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  and c o n c e p t u a l  o n t o l o g i e s .  Because t h e y  a r e  
h i s t o r i c a l ,  t h e y  l a c k  of coherence o r  " s t a b i l i t y "  and c a r r y  w i t h  them an i n h e r e n t  s e t  
of problems and conundrums. Moreover, t h e s e  o n t o l o g i e s  w i l l  be i n  ongoing 
c o m p e t i t i o n  o r  c o n t e s t a t i o n  w i t h  o t h e r  o n t o l o g i e s - - p r i m a r i l y  o v e r  winning 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  consensus  o v e r  ongoing p o i n t s  o f  c r u c i a l  d i f f e r e n c e . 6 6  These i n t e r n a l  
problems and e x t e r n a l  d e b a t e s  a r e  whol ly  p r o d u c t s  of t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  frameworks and 
t h e i r  a ssumpt ions .  Indeed t h e y  a r e  o n l y  c o n s i d e r e d  problems because  o f  t h e  c o n t e n t  
of t h e s e  o n t o l o g i e s .  Thus t h e s e  problems i n e v i t a b l y  c a r r y  w i t h i n  them t h e  
assumpt ions  o f  t h e i r  framework, and t h e  q u e s t i o n s  w e  a sk  i n  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  a r e  
themse lves  i n h e r e n t l y  o n t o l o g i c a l ,  m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l ,  o r  t o  p u t  it s imply ,  c o n t a i n  a  
p r i o r i  d e c i s i o n s  a b o u t  how w e  unders tand  t h e  s o c i a l  world  t o  be  c o n s t i t u t e d .  
The s h a p i n g  o f  problems by o n t o l o g i e s  works i n  two ways: f i r s t  i t  is  
u n q u e s t i o n a b l e  t h a t  o n t o l o g i e s  o f  t h e  world  w i l l  i n fo rm t h e  development of t h e  world  
(Adam S m i t h ' s ,  f o r  example, was a s  powerful  a s  any more " m a t e r i a l "  f o r c e )  and t h u s  be  
c o n s t i t u t i v e  t o  t h e ' " w o r l d 1 y "  t h i n g s  we t a k e  t o  b e  problems f o r  r e s e a r c h .  And 
second,  o n t o l o g i e s  of t h e  world  w i l l  shape  b o t h  t h e  way t h a t  con temporar ies  framed 
t h e i r  q u e s t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e i r  world--and t h u s  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  w e  i n h e r i t  and work from, 
a s  w e l l  a s  shape  t h e  v e r y  vocabu la ry  th rough  which we f rame o u r  c u r r e n t  q u e s t i o n s  and 
problems. Ques t ions ,  t h e n ,  a r e  t h e  l y n c h p i n  o f  t h e o r y  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  On t h e  one s i d e  
t h e y  l e a d  u s  t o  answers ,  and on t h e  o t h e r  t o  t h e y  f low from fundamental  assumptions .  
The i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  a r e  t h a t  w e  must d e v e l o p  ways o f  examining e a c h  of t h e s e  
t h r e e  "moments" of t h e o r y  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  T h i s  is t h e  t a s k  of a n  h i s t o r i c a l  
ep i s temology .  
P r o b l e m a t i z i n g  Q u e s t i o n s  
A c r u c i a l  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  pre-Kuhnian c o n c e p t i o n  o f  s c i e n c e  is t h a t  q u e s t i o n s  a r e  
s t a b l e ,  what changes  a r e  t h e  answers  a s  w e  a r e  b e t t e r  a b l e  t o  g a i n  a c c e s s  t o  and 
a c c u r a t e l y  measure t h e  wor ld .  I f  o u r  c o n j e c t u r e s  a r e  s o  randomly conceived,  t h e r e  is 
no v e r y  c o n v i n c i n g  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  how c e r t a i n  q u e s t i o n s  become more o r  less dominant 
a t  d i f f e r e n t  t i m e s ,  how c e r t a i n  q u e s t i o n s  a r e  more o r  l e s s  l e g i t i m a t e  a t  d i f f e r e n t  
t imes ,  and c e r t a i n l y  f o r  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  n a r r a t i v e  o f  how s c i e n c e  p r o g r e s s e s  o v e r  t ime .  
I f  t h i s  is  t r u e ,  t h e n  we have  no way t o  judge t h e  v a l u e  o f  o u r  q u e s t i o n s  even though 
we may r e c o g n i z e  t h e i r  c r u c i a l  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  r o l e  i n  t h e  e x p l a n a t o r y  p r o c e s s .  We 
a r e  thrown back t o  a  f o c u s  o n l y  on l o g i c ,  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  soundness  o f  method, and 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n - - e x a c t l y  where Popper and Carnap b e l i e v e d  t h e  f o c u s  shou ld  be.  
By c o n t r a s t ,  an h i s t o r i c a l  and n a r r a t i v e  ep i s temology  would begin  by l o o k i n g  
d i r e c t l y  a t  q u e s t i o n s ,  a t  problem-format ion.  A c r u c i a l  t a s k  i s  t o  e x p l o r e  how, and 
when, and why q u e s t i o n s  change o v e r  time--one way t o  p u t  i t  would be t h e  " r i s e  and 
f a l l  o f  q u e s t i o n s . "  E x p l o r i n g  why c e r t a i n  c o n c e p t s  become p r o b l e m a t i c  a t  c e r t a i n  
t i m e s  - ( t h e  "d i scovery"  o f  p o v e r t y ,  f o r  example, i n  l a t e  e i g h t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  England) ,  
why c e r t a i n  q u e s t i o n s  once c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  realm of  e t h i c s  o r  theo logy  a r e  
t r anformed  i n t o  q u e s t i o n s  of economics o r  m o r a l i t y ,  demands n o t  o n l y  a  deep  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s .  More i m p o r t a n t ,  it demands 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e  i n t e r n a l  l o g i c  of o u r  q u e s t i o n s  i n  o r d e r  t o  know why t h e i r  answers  
would r e s o n a t e  a t  c e r t a i n  t i m e s ,  and n o t  o t h e r s ,  t o  c e r t a i n  a u t h o r i t i e s ,  and n o t  
o t h e r s . 6 7  Looking a t  t h e  rise and f a l l  o f  q u e s t i o n s  w i l l  t e a c h  much about  t h e  r i s e  
and f a l l  o f  answers ,  and t h u s  t h e o r i e s .  
I f  o u r  e x p l o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  r i s e  and f a l l  o f  q u e s t i o n s  is t o  have meaning, i t  must 
be more t h a n  a  c o n t e x t u a l  n a r r a t i v e .  W e  would want t o  know how c e r t a i n  o n t o l o g i e s  
d i s t i n g u i s h  between r e l e v a n t  and i r r e l e v e a n t  q u e s t i o n s  a s  w e l l  a s  s u p e r i o r  and 
i n f e r i o r  methods f o r  answering them. I n  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  we d i s t i n g u i s h  between v a l i d  
q u e s t i o n s  a b o u t  e m p i r i c a l  c a u s a l i t y  and i n v a l i d  q u e s t i o n s  a b o u t  normat ive  c a u s a l i t y .  
E d u c a t i o n a l  achievement ,  f o r  example, c o n s t i t u t e s  a  s t a n d a r d  e x p l a n a t o r y  v a r i a b l e  i n  
h y p o t h e s e s  a b o u t  t h e  c a u s e s  o f  p o v e r t y ,  b u t  we do n o t  c o n s i d e r  q u e s t i o n s  abou t  t h e  
l i n k  between a  s o c i e t y ' s  l e v e l  o f ,  s a y ,  s o c i a l  j u s t i c e  t o  be a  comparable 
h y o p o t h e t i c a l  v a r i a b l e  ( a s  l e g i t i m a t e  as we may a g r e e  it t o  b e  f o r  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  
i n q u i r y . )  T h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  is  n o t  a  judgment a b o u t  whether  peop le  shou ld  be  
concerned a b o u t  j u s t i c e ;  indeed t h a t  j u s t i c e  is an  i r r e l e v a n t  c r i t e r i a  h a s  no b e a r i n g  
on t h e  normat ive  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  d i s c i p l i n e .  There  is i n s t e a d  a  "parad igmat ic"  
r e a s o n  f o r  why t h i s  q u e s t i o n  is r u l e d  o u t :  1 )  j u s t i c e  cannot  be measured; it cannot  
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even  be  d e f i n e d ,  s o  we cannot  a s k  abou t  it; 2 )  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  t h e  paradigm of  s o c i a l  
L- s c i e n c e  h a s  ex luded  i s s u e s  o f  moral  ph i loshophy  from i ts  p r o b l e m a t i c s .  These 
( .  assumpt ions  s o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  spectrum w i t h i n  which t h e  problems of s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  
i. r e s e a r c h  o p e r a t e .  . . 
Through t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  d i s c o v e r y  h i s t o r y  w i l l y - n i l l y  e n t e r s  i n t o  t h e  l o g i c  of 
*. b o t h  s c i e n c e  and s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  a rgumenta t ion ,  and i n t o  t h e  conundrums of b e i n g  and 
:-< A . knowing. S i n c e  q u e s t i o n s  a r e  s o  i m p o r t a n t ,  and q u e s t i o n s  come from concep tua l  and 
. o n t o l o g i c a l  frameworks which c a r r y  w i t h i n  them ongoing p r o b l e m a t i c s ,  t h e  r e a l  
c h a l l e n g e  i s  t o  p r o b l e m a t i z e  o u r  problems. I s u g g e s t  t h i s  can be approached by 
r' d e c o n s t r u c t i n g  and h i s t o r i c i z i n g  o u r  c o n c e p t u a l  frameworks, c a t e g o r i e s ,  and 
vocabu la r ies - -our  t h i n k i n g  a b o u t  ways o f  be ing .  
Ways o f  b e i n g : . t h e  h i s t o r i c i t y  of o n t o l o g i e s  .-.-- 
The g o a l  o f  a  n a r r a t i v e  ep i s temology  i s  t o  e x p l o r e  t h e  p r o c e s s  by which t h o s e  
- - 
problems which have such  a  f o r m a t i v e  p l a c e  i n  t h e o r y  c o n s t r u c t i o n  g e t  i d e n t i f i e d  a s  
such-- in  t ime  and o v e r  t ime .  Th is  means examining t h e  c u l t u r a l  and s o c i a l  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  c o n c e p t u a l  o n t o l o g i e s ,  and i n  t u r n  t o  examine t h e  i n t e r n a l  l o g i c  of 
t h e i r  c a t e g o r i e s  and assumpt ions  a s  t h e y  unfo lded  h i s t o r i c a l l y .  The g o a l  i s  n o t  
p r i m a r i l y  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  "why" i n  s e n s e  o f  l o c a t i n g  a  s o c i o l o g i c a l  environment ;  it is  
more t o  u n d e r s t a n d  "how" competing s e t s  of o n t o l o g i e s  of i d e n t i t y ,  p o l i t i c a l  l i f e ,  
s o c i e t y ,  and s o  on g a i n  c u r r e n c y  and shape t h e  e m p i r i c a l  problems we e n c o u n t e r  a s  
h i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g i s t s .  
The i d e a  o f  a  knowledge c u l t u r e  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e  v e r y  o n t o l o g i e s  t h a t  shape  o u r  
q u e s t i o n s  a r e  c o n t i n g e n t  and h i s t o r i c a l .  Thinking abou t  t h i s  o n t o l o g i c a l  dilemma 
from an  h i s t o r i c a l  and n a r r a t i v e  ep i s temology  l e a d s  t o  a  d i f f e r e n t  s t r a t e g y  f o r  
t h i n k i n g  a b o u t  t h e  o n t o l o g i c a l  s t a l e m a t e :  namely, t h a t  o u r  t h e o r e t i c l  renewal cannot  
p rocede  w i t h o u t  an  h i s t o r i c a l  one.  We need t o  look a t  t h e  encoding o f  c a t e g o r y  by 
h i s t o r y .  Here I am n o t  s p e a k i n g  of l o o k i n g  f o r  c o n t e x t .  Ra ther  I a m  s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  
most o f  what we i n  s o c i o l o g y  t r e a t  a s  a b s t r a c t  o r  " p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l "  c a t e g o r i e s - -  
s u b j e c t  and o b j e c t ,  a g e n t  and s t r u c t u r e  f o r  example--carry w i t h i n  them " f rozen"  
h i s t o r i c a l  arguments  which have been " a b s t r a c t e d "  i n t o  o u r  f a m i l i a r  g e n e r a l  
c a t e g o r i e s .  To " u n f r e e z e "  r e q u i r e s  an  "undoing" and t h a t  r e q u i r e s  h i s t o r y .  The 
t h e o r e t i c a l  t a s k  is t h u s  a n  h i s t o r i c a l  one:  we cannot  overcome t h e  h i s t o r i c i t y  of our  
t h e o r y  w i t h o u t  a  new look  a t  t h e  h i s t o r y  'it encodes .  But we c a n n o t  r e r e a d  h i s t o r y  
w i t h o u t  a  new c o n c e p t u a l  framework--at l e a s t  t e n t a t i v e .  S ince  e a c h  t a s k  r e q u i r e s  t h e  
o t h e r ,  b o t h  must proceed a t  once.68 
From Ian  Hacking, I l i f t  t h e  p h r a s e  " t a k i n g  a  look" t o  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h i s  k ind of 
p ro jec t - -one  which j o i n s  h i s t o r y  and epis temology.  It d e n o t e s  a  form of  c o n c e p t u a l  
a n a l y s i s  t h a t  I f i r s t  used i n  my work on E n g l i s h  working c l a s s  p o l i t i c s  and 
c i t i z e n s h i p - - o n e  which developed from my r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  a v a i l a b l e  concep tua l  
vocabu la ry  o f  c l a s s ,  s o c i a l  change,  p o l i t i c s ,  and c i t i z e n s h i p  were a l l  encoded wi th  
t h e  v e r y  r e a d i n g s  of t h a t  h i s t o r y  I was now c r i t i c i z i n g .  I a m  c a l l i n g  f o r  a  g e n e t i c  
a c c o u n t i n g  o f  c o n c e p t u a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n s  which is n e i t h e r  i n t e l l e c t u a l  h i s t o r y ,  nor  
t h e  s o c i o l o g y  o f  knowledge.69 I am n o t  a s k i n g  whether  t h e s e  i d e a s  a r e  " t r u e "  o r  
" f a l s e " ,  b u t  r a t h e r  how and t o  what e f f e c t  i d e a s  and o n t o l o g i e s  a r e  even c o n s i d e r e d  
e i t h e r  t r u e  o r  f a l s e ,  how t h e y  g a i n  and l o s e  t h e i r  c u r r e n c y  and resonance.  Th is  
means e x p l o r i n g  t h e  c u l t u r a l ,  h i s t o r i c a l  and n a r r a t i v e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  concep t s .  
What makes it n a r r a t i v e  is t h a t  t h i s  k ind  of h i s t o r y  is n o t  a  c h r o n i c l e  o f  e v e n t s ;  
i n s t e a d  l i k e  a  n a r r a t i v i e  s t r u c t u r e  it t r i e s  t o  f i n d  t h o s e  r e a s o n i n g  p r a c t i c e s  
embedded i n  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n s  t h a t  a l lowed meaning and resonance  o v e r  
t ime.  Many o f  F o u c a u l t ' s  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  C h a r l e s  T i l l y ' s  d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  
n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y ,  a s  w e l l  a s  C h a r l e s  T a y l o r ' s  and A l a s d a i r  MacIn ty re ' s  books on t h e  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  s e l f  cou ld  a l l  s e r v e  a s  exemplars.70 
The whole premise  o f  t h i s  approach i s  t h a t  knowing how we g o t  t o  where we a r e  
w i l l  h e l p  t o  c i a r i f y  where we a r e . 7 1  . T h i s  is n o t  an a t t e m p t  t o  " r e c o v e r "  t h e  p a s t ,  
and c e r t a i n l y  n o t  a  c l a i m  t h a t ' t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  of p a s t  a c t o r s  is  t h e  a u t h e n t i c  
means t o  d o i n g  so .72 R a t h e r ,  i f  we can u n d e r s t a n d  what p u t s  i d e a s  and knowledges i n  
p l a c e  and what b r i n g s  them i n t o  being--not a  t e l e o l o g y  b u t  an  account  o f  
c o n t i n g e n c i e s  and "might have beensw--we can h o p e f u l l y  b e t t e r  g r a s p  t h e  meanings and 
t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h o s e  i d e a s ,  and t h e i r  r o l e  i n  problem-formation.  T h i s ,  t o  be s u r e ,  
is  p a r t  o f  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  d i s c o v e r y  t h a t  l o g i c a l  p o s i t i v i s m  h a s  d i s m i s s e d  a s  
committ ing t h e  " g e n e t i c  f a l l a c y . "  But s i n c e  t h e  approach is  e x p l i c i t l y  non- 
t e l e o l o g i c a l ,  I t h i n k  t h a t  t h e  l a b l e  " g e n e t i c  f a l l a c y "  is i n s u b s t a n t i a l  name-cal l ing 
produced by an  o v e r l y  g r e a t  a d m i r a t i o n  f o r  a p r i o r i  l o g i c . 7 3  
Indeed i t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  t h i s  approach t h a t  has  c o n t r i b u t e d  s o  m i g h t i l y  t o  t h e  
c h a l l e n g e s  o f  t h e  a n t i - h i s t o r i c a l  view of ha rd  s c i e n c e .  The work o f  Bruno La tour ,  
Andy P i c k e r i n g ,  Simon S c h a f f e r  and S teven  Shapin a l l  demons t ra te  t h e  power o f  g e n e t i c  
a c c o u n t s  o f  n a t u r a l  s c i e n c e  l o g i c  and knowledge. These works conc lude  t h a t  w h i l e  
n a t u r a l  e n t i t i e s  do e x i s t ,  t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s ,  c a t e g o r i e s ,  c o n c e p t s  o f  s c i e n c e ,  from 
Quarks t o  atoms, a r e  n o t  "found" i n  n a t u r e  b u t  i n  t i m e ,  and c o n s t r u c t e d  th rough  
h i s t o r i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s . 7 4  To emphasize t h e  p o i n t :  I do n o t  s u g g e s t  t h a t  n a t u r e  is  
"made up"; I d o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  t h e  t h e o r i e s  which c a t e g o r i z e  n a t u r e  a r e  made up, hence 
t h e o r e t i c a l  e n t i t i e s  a r e  made up. But  t h e  e n t i t i e s  o u t l a s t  t h e  t h e o r i e s .  (Th is  may 
u l t i m a t e l y  d i s t i n g u i s h  s o c i a l  from n a t u r a l  s c i e n c e ,  where t h e  fo rmer  may indeed be 
whol ly  a  p r a c t i c e  o f  s o c i a l  c o n s r u c t i o n . )  With a  view t o  t h o s e  p r o c e s s e s  and 
p r i n c i p l e s  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  why c e r t a i n  problems p e r s i s t  becomes much 
c l e a r e r . 7 5  
L e t  m e  now t u r n  t o  a second p o s s i b l e  model f o r  an h i s t o r i c a l  epis temology.  One 
p l a c e  t o  look  is  j u s t  t h a t  f i e l d  t o  which we pay l i p - s e r v i c e  b u t  t o  which we i n  f a c t  
pay v e r y  l i t t l e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  r e s p e c t - - t h e  f i e l d  o f  h i s t o r y .  One o f  t h e  i r o n i e s  of 
t h e  h i s t o r i c  t u r n  i n  s o c i o l o g y  i s  t h a t  we have t u r n e d  t o  " h i s t o r y "  a s  d a t a ,  b u t  n o t  
t o  t h e  r e c e n t  d i s c i p l i n a r y  p r a c t i c e s  and r e f l e c t i o n s  o f  h i s t o r y  i t s e l f .  I f  we had i n  
f a c t  made t h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  h i s t o r y  as much t h e  s u b j e c t  of o u r  i n t e l l e c t u a l  i n t e r e s t s  
a s  t h e  scavenging o f  t h e  d a t a  o f  h i s t o r y ,  we would have n o t i c e d  t h a t  a t  j u s t  t h e  
moment s o  many d i s c i p l i n e s  a r e  making t h e  " h i s t o r i c  t u r n "  w i t h  g r e a t  hope and 
a n t i c i p a t i o n ,  o u r  c o l l e a g u e s  i n  h i s t o r y  a r e  th rowing  up t h e i r  hands and saying-- 
" h i s t o r y !  w h a t ' s  h i s t o r y ? "  And i n  r e s p o n s e  t h e y  a r e  making t h e i r  own tu rn- - the  
" l i n g u i s t i c  one.  "76 
It is  u n f o r t u n a t e  t h a t  t h e  t u r n  i n  h i s t o r y  h a s  been s o  l a b e l l e d .  For it h a s  
f o s t e r e d  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  o u r  p r e v i o u s l y  s t o l i d  c o l l e a g u e s  t h e  h i s t o r i a n s  a r e  now 
c l a i m i n g  t h a t  t h e  world  is  a l l  " t e x t . "  T h a t  u n d e r s t a n d a b l y  s c a r e s  s o c i o l o g i s t s ,  most 
o f  whom make t h e i r  l i v i n g  t r y i n g  t o  unders tand  t h e  " r e a l "  s o c i a l  world.  I t  h a s  made 
l i t t l e  impact  t h a t  most h i s t o r i a n s  a r e  q u i c k  t o  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  t h e y  d o n ' t  r e a l l y  mean 
t e x t  i n  t h e  l i t e r a l  s e n s e  a s  words, b u t  t e x t s  as systems of  meaning which embrace a l l  
t h e  r e g u l a r  o b j e c t s  o f  s o c i o l o g i c a l  s t u d y - - s o c i a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  c l a s s ,  bureaucracy ,  
and s o  on. T h i s  d i s c l a i m e r  makes t h e  u n l i k e l y  presumption t h a t  s o c i o l o g i s t s  w i l l  
overcome t h e i r  d i s t r u s t  l o n g  enough t o  r e a d  t h i s  f a r  i n t o  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e .  
A b e t t e r  way of  c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  t h i s  i m p o r t a n t  development i n  h i s t o r y  would be  
t h e  " e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  t u r n "  s i n c e  what i s  b e i n g  a rgued  is  t h a t  we cannot  unders tand  
t h e  world  w i t h o u t  examining s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  how t h a t  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  is mediated through 
c o n c e p t u a l  frameworks.77 They a r e  s u g g e s t i n g  q u i t e  s imply t h a t  i n  between t h e  
"unthought"  world  and o u r  t h i n k i n g  abou t  t h e  world a r e  c o n c e p t u a l  " f i l t e r s . "  And 
most i m p o r t a n t ,  t h e s e  a r e  d e e p l y  h i s t o r i c a l .  I d o n t  t a k e  t h i s  t o  mean we shou ld  no 
l o n g e r  c a r e  a b o u t  t h e  s o c i a l  world;  indeed I t a k e  i t - t o  mean t h a t  o u r  s o c i o l o g i c a l  
c o n c e r n s  w i l l  be  c o n s i d e r a b l y  more grounded i f  we a l s o  t a k e  t h o s e  h i s t o r i c a l  f i ' l t e r s  
t o  be  n e c e s s a r y  s u b j e c t s  o f  i n q u i r y .  S c o t t ,  f o r  example, h a s  tu rned  h e r  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
t h e  d e e p l y  grounded e m p i r i c a l  i s s u e s  o f  c l a s s  fo rmat ion ,  p o l i t i c s ,  and gender  
p r e c i s e l y  by a n a l y z i n g  t h e  ways t h a t  t h e  c o n c e p t s  of c l a s s ,  p o l i t i c s ,  and gender  were 
c e n t r a l .  t o  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  of h e r  h i s t o r i c a l  s u b j e c t s . 7 8  
Act ion  and Order H i s t o r i c i z e d  
Taking a  look a t  t h e  h i s t o r i c i t y  of " p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l "  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  s o c i a l  
t h o u g h t  a l s o  i n v o l v e s  a s k i n g  how t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  c o n s t r u c t i o n  and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  o f  a 
c o n c e p t  shaped and c o n t i n u e s  t o  shape  i t s  l o g i c a l  d imensions  and i ts s o c i a l  meanings. 
Hacking c a l l s  t h i s  l e v e l  o f  concep tua l  a n a l y s i s  look ing  a t  words i n  t h e i r  " s i t e s . "  
I t  is a n o t h e r  approach t o  h i s t o r i c i z i n g  by l o c a t i n g  c o n c e p t u a l  p r o b l e m a t i c s  n o t  o n l y  
i n  t ime ,  b u t  i n  c o n c e p t u a l  space .  S i t e s  i n c l u d e  " s e n t e n c e s ,  u t t e r e d  o r  t r a n s c r i b e d ,  
a lways i n  a l a r g e r  s i t e  of neighborhood, i n s t i t u t i o n ,  a u t h o r i t y ,  language"79 w i t h o u t  
which i d e a s  would be j u s t  words, no t  concep t s .  Looking a t  t h e  r i s e  and f a l l  of  moral  
and s o c i a l  c o n c e p t s  a s  words i n  t h e i r  s i t e s ,  and i n  t i m e ,  r e v e a l s  t h e i r  e x i s t e n c e  a s  
h i s t o r i c a l - - a n d  t h u s  c o n t i n g e n t - e n t i t i e s .  
Le t  m e  exempl i fy  by r e t u r n i n g  t o  t h e  o n t o l o g i c a l  impasse of agency and s t r u c t u r e  
and s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  l o g i c .  We know t h a t  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  framework o f  modern s o c i a l  
s c i e n c e  h a s  a  b u i l t - i n  a p o r i a  between agency and o r d e r ,  an  a p o r i a  i n  p a r t  born o f  t h e  
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  ep i s temology  I d e s c r i b e d  i n  t h e  open ing  paragraph .80  My own r e s e a r c h  
h a s  convinced me t h a t  t h e  a p o r i a s  of agency and o r d e r  a r e  n o t  o n l y  a  p roduc t  o f  t h e  
l o g i c  o f  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e ;  pe rhaps  even more s i g n i f i c a n t l y  t h e y  r e s t  on t h e  c o r e  of an 
h i s t o r i c a l  " n a r r a t i v e "  o f  modern iza t ion  t h e o r y ,  and t h e  m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l  a t t e m p t  t o  
r e s o l v e  t h e  conundrum f l o u n d e r s  on t h e  unexplored h i s t o r i c i t y  of i ts  , c e n t r a l  
c a t e g o r i e s .  
Modern s o c i a l  t h e o r y  was c r a f t e d  o u t  o f  e p i c  moments i n  h i s t b r y .  Plagues ,  wars ,  
f amines ,  and r e v o l u t i o n s  a l l  p l a y  t h e i r  p a r t s ;  t h e  Black Death,  t h e  E n g l i s h  C i v i l  
War, t h e  Reformat ion,  t h e  French Revolu t ion ,  t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  Revolu t ion  a l l  f i g u r e  a s  
shadows i n  t h e  h e a r t  o f  t h e  m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l  and t h e o r e t i c a l  framework. The c l a s s i c a l  
f o u n d e r s  c o n s t r u c t e d  a  s o c i a l  t h e o r y  based upon an  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  of t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  
and e m p i r i c a l  world.  ( Indeed t h e  v e r y  power and d u r a b i l i t y  of s o c i o l o g i c a l  thought  
can  o n l y  be  e x p l a i n e d  by t h e  s u b s t a n t i v e  and e m p i r i c a l  c o n t e n t  of i ts  c o r e  p r i n c i p l e s  
and t h e  c o n c e p t s  t o  which it gave r i s e . )  Its p r i n c i p l e s  t h u s  emerged from--and s o  , 
encoded--the m a c r o - s o c i o l o g i c a l  o b s e s s i o n  t h a t  p o s s e s s e d  them a l l ,  namely, how t o  
e x p l a i n  t h e  emergence and  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  modern w o r l d ' a n d  its epocha l  b r e a k  from 
" t r a d i t i o n a l  s o c i e t y . "  The a p o r i a s  o f  modern s o c i o l o g y  can be t r a c e d  t o  more t h a n  an 
a b s t r a c t  e x p l a n a t o r y  l o g i c  and r e v o l u t i o n a r y  n a t u r a l i s m .  These were c a t e g o r i e s  
g e n e r a t e d  by a  f u s i o n  o f  h i s t o r y  and ep i s temology .  
What were t h e  consequences  of t h i s  i n e x t r i c a b l e  en tang lement  of t h e  new s o c i a l  
s c i e n t i f i c  n a t u r a l i s m  of  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s  o f  t h e  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ?  
C l a s s i c a l  modern iza t ion  theory- - the  m a c r o - t h e o r e t i c a l  schema aimed a t  d e s c r i b i n g  and 
e x p l a i n i n g  t h e  making o f  t h e  modern Western world ,  its s t r u c t u r a l  and  i t s  s o c i a l  
dynamics--was t h e  outcome, indeed  t h e  g r e a t  and l a s t i n g  i n v e n t i o n ,  o f  t h i s  complex 
f u s i o n  of h i s t o r y  and t h e o r y .  The new t h e o r i s t s  of s o c i e t y  dep loyed  t h e  s o c i a l  
s c i e n t i f i c  t o o l s  o f  Townsend's n a t u r a l i s m  t o  c a r v e  o u t  t h e i r  v iews o f  t h e  macroscopic  
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  of t h e  s o c i a l  world and a b s t r a c t e d  h i s t o r i c a l  p r o c e s s e s  t o  f l e s h  o u t  
an h i s t o r i c a l l y  v i c t o r i o u s  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  v i s i o n .  They a l i g n e d  themse lves  w i t h  t h e  
w i l l f u l  optimism of t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  ep i s temology  by propounding a  most un ique  i d e a :  
I f  t h e  n a t u r e  of modern s o c i e t y  cou ld  be conce ived  a s  o r g a n i z e d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  
s y s t e m i c  laws o f  n a t u r e ,  t h e  emergence of modern i ty  c o u l d  be e x p l a i n e d  by an 
endogeneous,  r a t i o n a l ,  and p r o g r e s s i v e  l o g i c  shed of t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  o f  e t h i c s  and 
law, p o l i t i c a l  a u t h o r i t y ,  r e l i g i o n ,  and k i n s h i p .  New c o n c e p t s  were un leashed ,  now 
guided by a  s e t  of " p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s " :  t h e  s o c i a l  world was deve lopmenta l ly  b i f u r c a t e d  
between ' t r a d i t i o n '  and ' m o d e r n i t y ' ,  was d r i v e n  by t h e  r e l e n t l e s s  motor o f  t e c h n i c a l  
r a t i o n a l i t y  which had t h e  power t o  remake s o c i e t y ,  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  s o c i a l  l i f e ,  even 
t h e  drama of  human i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  i t s e l f ,  i n  i ts  own image. 
Modern s o c i o l o g i c a l  l o g i c  and t h e  n a r r a t i v e s  o f  c l a s s i c a l  modern iza t ion  theory--  
a n  enmeshing o f  h i s t o r y  and epis temology--are  i n e l u c t a b l y  e n t a n g l e d .  Tha t  t h e s e  
h i s t o r i c a l  c o n s t e l l a t i o n s  have s o  l o n g  passed  a s  u n i v e r s a l  t r u t h  is a  major  s o u r c e  of 
t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  d u a l i t i e s  and a n t i n o m i e s  of s o c i o l o g i c a l  t h o u g h t .  Ours is a  s o c i a l  
t h e o r y  comprised o f  b o t h  h i s t o r i c a l  concep t s  and a  c o n c e p t u a l  h i s t o r y .  What we know 
today  as s o c i a l  t h e o r y  and meta theory  a r e  t h e  l egacy  of t h o s e  h i s t o r i c a l  f ragments  
d i s t i l l e d  i n t o  a b s t r a c t  o n t o l o g i c a l  and s c i e n t i f i c  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s .  These e s s e n t i a l  
c a t e g o r i e s  o f  o u r  " f r o z e n  o b s e r v a t i o n  languageo--whether d e f i n e d  a s  agency and 
s t r u c t u r e ,  s u b j e c t  and o b j e c t - - a r e  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l  o n l y  i n  t h e  d e g r e e  t o  which t h e y  
a r e  u n i v e r s a l l y  d e f i n e d  a s  s o c i a l  s c i e n t i f i c  g i v e n s .  
We may have a r r i v e d  a t  one  of t h e  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e  e n d u r i n g  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  
o n t o l o g i c a l  impasse o v e r  agency and s t r u c r e  i n  h i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g y .  Agency and 
s t r u c t u r e  a r e  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n a l  and o n t o l o g ~ c a l  c o n c e p t s  which w e r e  a c r e a t i o n  o f  a  
p a r t i c u l a r  h i s t o r i c a l  n a r r a t i v e .  I t  is t h e i r  unexamined and d e e p l y  p r o b l e m a t i c  
h i s t o r i c i t y  t h a t  is  c e n t r a l  t o  t h e  o n t o l o g i c a l  dilemma of  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e .  I f  
s o c i o l o g y ' s  impasses  a r e  i n  t h e  o r i g i n a l  f u s i o n  o f  m a c r o - h i s t o r i c a l  a n a l y s i s  and 
ep i s temology ,  s o l v i n g  t h e  o n t o l o g i c a l  impasse cannot  be  accomplished by j u g g l i n g  w i t h  
t h e  problems o f  o r d e r  and a c t i o n  u n t i l  a  ' 'mul t id imensional  d i a l e c t i c "  emerges.  I f  
t h e  c o n c e p t s  we u s e  t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  world  are h i s t o r i c i z e d  and l i m i t e d  it f o l l o w s  
t h a t  we must d e c o n s t r u c t  t h e  h i s t o r i c i t y  of t h e  concep t s  w e  u s e  by means o f  an  
h i s t o r i c a l  ep i s temology .  Agency and s t r u c t u r e  i n  s o c i a l  t h e o r y  must be.  re-examined 
i n  t h e i r  o r i g i n s  and i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  c l a s s i c a l  modern iza t ion  t h e o r y .  W e  must 
indeed  " t a k e  a  look ."  Here a r e  b r i e f  s p e c u l a t i v e  c o n c l u s i o n s  from h a v i n g  done s o  
e l sewhere .  81 
R e c a l l  t h e  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  t e m p l a t e  f o r  t h e  problem of a c t i o n  a s  e x p r e s s e d  i n  
Townsend's f a n t a s i a  of t h e  g o a t s  and t h e  dogs  on t h e  i s l e  of Juan  Fernandez.  T h i s  
n a t u r a l i s m  was one moment o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  p r o g r e s s i v i s m  of  e i g h t e e n t h  
and n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y  s c i e n c e  and p o l i t i c s .  Faced w i t h  t h e  dilemma t h a t  n a t u r a l i s m  
i n e v i t a b l y  t h r e a t e n e d  t o  a n n i h i l a t e  t h e  s u b j e c t ,  s o c i o l o g i c a l  t h e o r y  d i d  n o t  bury  a  
t h e o r y  of a c t i o n .  Ra ther ,  i t  made an u n l i k e l y  c o n j o i n i n g  o f  n a t u r a l i s m  w i t h  t h e  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  c o u n t e r p a r t  t o  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r a l  progressivism--what I have c a l l e d  t h e  
" r e v o l u t i o n a r y  idiom o f  a c t i o n . "  What made t h i s  view of t h e  s u b j e c t  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  
was t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  agency i n t o  an  a b s t r a c t  i n d i v i d u a l  d r i v e n  
by t h e  m o t i v a t i o n  of "freedom from ..." a n y t h i n g  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  world  c a r i c a t u r e d  
a s  Gemeinschaft  o r  t r a d i t i o n a l  s o c i e t y .  T h i s  was a modernized o n t o l o g y  of  
p r o g r e s s i v e  autonomy. Although Marx, Weber, and Durkheim e a c h  had d i f f e r e n t  n o t i o n s  
o f  t h e  autonomous a c t o r ,  a l l  t h r e e  n o n e t h e l e s s  a p p r o p r i a t e d  t h e  s t r i v i n g  f o r  
autonomy. Consequently--and i n e v i t a b l y - - t h e y  e a c h  b u i l t  t h e i r  t h e o r i e s  on t h e  d u a l i t y  
o f  s u b j e c t  and o b j e c t ,  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  v e r s u s  s o c i e t y .  I n  t h i s  schema, t h e  i d e n t i t y  
o f  t h e  s u b j e c t  was a b s t r a c t e d  from h i s t o r y ;  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
p r a c t i c e s - - e v e n  c o l l e c t i v e  memory--would e x i s t  a s  e x t e r n a l  o b j e c t s  o f  power and 
c o n s t r a i n t .  
A s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  idiom, much of  t h e  d a t a  o f  s o c i a l  a c t i o n  h a s  
been t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  p r o b l e m a t i z i n g ,  and u s u a l l y  e x p l a i n e d  by r e c o u r s e  
t o  some v e r s i o n  o f  s o c i a l  determinism.  Why? Because t h e  d i s p o s s e s s e d ~ m o d e r n  a g e n t  
is "less l i b e r a t e d  t h a n  disempowered"82, indeed  cannot--even h e u r i s t i c a l l y  o r  
" a n a l y t i c a l l y n - - e x i s t .  To p r o t e c t  t h i s  idiom of agency, a c t i o n  t h a t  d o e s  n o t  conform 
t o  i t s  p o s t u l a t e s  must be  e x p l a i n e d  by t h e  e x t e r n a l  power of o r d e r  o r  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
c o n s t r a i n t - - b e  i t  norms and s o c i a l  laws,  b u r e a u c r a t i c  power, o r  economic f o r c e s .  The 
idfom of  t h e  modern a g e n t  t h u s  c o n t a i n s  a  b u i l t - i n  and p a r a d o x i c a l  mechanism of s e l f -  
e x t i n c t i o n :  it s t r i v e s  t o  a s s e r t  moral  agency a g a i n s t  t h e  determinism of t h e  
n a t u r a l i s t i c  l o g i c  of s o c i e t y ,  b u t  its c r i t e r i a  f o r  a u t h e n t i c  agency f o r c e s  
s t r u c t u r e / o r d e r / s o c i e t y  i n t o  an o p p o s i t i o n a l  and e x t e r n a l  sys tem of dominat ion.  
A s p i r i n g  t o  e s s e n t i a l i z e  and f r e e z e  a  u n i v e r s a l l y  autonomous modern s u b j e c t  h a s  
c o n s i s t e n t l y  p rob lemat ized  forms o f  moral  agency t h a t  l i n k  autonomy t o  complex 
r e l a t i o n a l i t y  and t h u s  makes i d e n t i t y  b o t h  n o n - e s s e n t i a l i z e d  and v a r i a b l e .  The 
consequences  o f  t h i s  p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n  i n  s o c i o l o g y  a r e  u s u a l l y  d i z z y i n g  t a u t o l o g i e s  
a b o u t  " i n t e r n a l i z e d  s o c i a l  norms." When a c t i o n  is  i n  t h e  f i n a l  a n a l y s i s  d e f i n e d  a s  
i n t e r n a l i z e d  s o c i a l  norms, t h e  meaning of a c t i o n  becomes "over-sociologized"83--a 
mere r e f l e c t i o n  o f  a  s t a g e  i n  a  d e v e l o p i n g  s o c i a l  o r d e r .  In  t h i s ,  agency is de tached  
from h i s t o r y ,  t i m e ,  and s p a c e  w h i l e  remade by t h e  r e s t l e s s  momentum of  changing 
s o c i a l  c o n d i t i o n s .  The autonomy of a c t i o n  cannot  s u r v i v e  t h i s  o n t o l o g y  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t  
which can o n l y  e x p l a i n  agency by r e c o u r s e  t o  t h e  e x t e r n a l  s o c i a l  order , ;  depr ived  of 
s u b s t a n c e ,  a c t i o n  can o n l y  be a  response  t o  c o l l e c t i v e  c o n s t r a i n t  o r  
i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n s .  
T h i s  is  n o t  t h e  p l a c e  t o  s p e l l  o u t  a l t e r n a t i v e  c o n c e p t i o n s  o f  o n t o l o g i e s .  
I n s t e a d  I would j u s t  p o i n t  t o  t h e  tremendous r e v i t a l i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  c u l t u r e  concept .84 
I n  my own r e s e a r c h ,  I developed t h e  concep t  of a " n a r r a t i v e  i d e n t i t y . "  I found it t o  
be  c a p a c i o u s  and h i s t o r i c a l l y  s e n s i t i v e  enough t o  c a p t u r e  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  c o n t e s t e d  
meanings of t h e  s e l f  and agency. Admit tedly  a  n o n - s o c i o l o g i c a l  e x p r e s s i o n ,  it 
r e f l e c t s  n o n e t h e l e s s  my e f f o r t  t o  c a p t u r e  t h e  n o n - f i x i t y  of agency. The " n a r r a t i v e "  
s u g g e s t  i d e n t i t i e s  were n o t  formed by i n t e r e s t s  imputed from a  s t a g e  o f  s o c i e t a l  
development (be  it p r e - i n d u s t r i a l  o r  modern),  o r  by "exper ience"  imputed from a  
s o c i a l  c a t e g o r y  (such a s  t r a d i t i o n a l  a r t i s a n ,  f a c t o r y  l a b o u r e r ,  o r  working-class  
w i f e )  , b u t  by a  p e r s o n ' s  "p lace"  i n  c u l t u r a l  s e t t t i n g s  comprised of ( b r e a k a b l e )  
r u l e s ,  ( v a r i a b l e )  p r a c t i c e s  and d i s c o u r s e s ,  b i n d i n g  (and unb ind ing)  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  
The concep t  o f  n a r r a t i v e  i d e n t i t y  is i n t e n d e d  t o  make a c t i o n  and agency n o t  an e v e n t  
b u t  an episode--one t h a t  i s  shaped by b o t h  memory and a n t i c i p a t i o n .  T h i s  makes 
i d e n t i t i e s  b o t h  m a l l e a b l e  and c o n t e s t e d ,  b u t  n o n e t h e l e s s  o n l y  i n t e l l i g i b l e  through 
t h e  c u l t u r a l  n a r r a t i v e s  o f  t h e i r  p a s t .  N a r r a t i v i t y  a l s o  e l i m i n a t e s  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  
c e r t a i n  a c t i o n s  a r e  r a t i o n a l  w h i l e  o t h e r s  a r e  i r r a t i o n a l  o r  "backwards-looking";  t h e  
c o n t e x t s  which g i v e  meaning, con t ingency ,  and h i s t o r i c i t y  t o  i d e n t i t y  have no 
t e l e o g o g y .  I f  i d e n t i t i e s  a r e  indeed n a r r a t i v e  and h i s t o r i c a l l y  c o n s t i t u t e d ,  it would 
seem i m p o s s i b l e  t o  d e f i n e  a b s o l u t e l y  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  s e l f .  It  is  t i m e  t o  t u r n  t o  
t h e  more c h a l l e n g i n g  q u e s t i o n  o f  h o w - i d e n t i t i e s  a r e  formed i n  v a r y i n g . c o n t e x t s . 8 5  
&s of  Expla in ing :  H i s t o r i c i t y  and t h e  Context  o f  J u s t i f i c a t i o n  -
I n  t h i s  l a s t  s e c t i o n  I w i l l  be  u s i n g  t h e  p h r a s e  " n a r r a t i v e  c a u s a l i t y "  t o  d e n o t e  - 
a  form o f  e x p l a n a t i o n  t h a t  i n c o r p o r a t e s  sequence ,  temporal  o r d e r  and con t ingency .  
T h i s  d e t a c h e s  c a u s e  from i ts  a l l i a n c e  w i t h  p r e d i c t i o n  and g e n e r a l  a  p r i o r i  l o g i c ,  and 
r e s t o r i n g  t o  i t  i ts  c o r e  constituents--narrativity, sequence,  t e m p o r a l i t y ,  and 
con t ingency .  Le t  me r e t u r n  t o  S k o c p o l ' s  and Somers' t h r e e  modes o f  i n q u i r y  and 
s t r a t e g i e s  o f  j u s t i f f i c a t i o n  d i s c u s s e d  above.  I n  t h e  absence  of a  a l t e r n a t i v e  model 
o f  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  a t t e m p t s  t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  h i s t o r i c i t y  remain v u l n e r a b l e  t o  t h e  c h a r g e s  
o f  "na ive  i n d u c t i v i s t  empi r ic i sm."86  T h i s  is  t h e  charge  i s s u e d  most vehemently by 
Edgar K i s e r  and Michael Hechter  i n  a  r e c e n t  a t t a c k  on h i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g i s t s .  T h e i r  
c h a r g e  i s ' d i r e c t e d  e s p e c i a l l y  a t  what Skocpol h a s  c a l l e d  " a n a l y t i c  i n d u c t i v i s m W - - t h e  
method of  b u i l d i n g  arguments from h i s t o r i c a l  r e s e a r c h  u s i n g  a n a l y t i c  c o n c e p t s  t o  
o r g a n i z e  ev idence .  They l ambas t  h i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g y  f o r  i t s  l a c k  o f  u n i v e r s a l i t y ,  
c l a i m i n g  i t  is n o t  broad enough i n  scope  and "bold"  enough i n  i t s  p r o p o s i t i o n s .  
Where a r e  w e  t o  look  f o r  a d e q u a t e  r e s p o n s e s  t o  t h e s e  r e a f f i r m a t i o n s  o f  a n t i -  
h i s t o r i c a l  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  e x p l a n a t i o n ?  The m a c r o a n a l y t i c  a l t e r n a t i v e  h a s  i t s e l f  been 
a b l e  t o  make t e m p o r a l i t y  a  c o n s t i t u t i v e  p a r t  of i ts  c a u s a l  s t r a t e g y - - r e v e r t i n g  
i n s t e a d  t o  a n  i n t e r a c t i v e  model of converg ing  v a r i a b l e s  r a t h e r  t h a n  a  c o n t i n g e n t  
p r o c e s s  o f  n a r r a t i v e  sequence.  The hermeneu t ic  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  a c c e p t i n g  u n c r i t i c a l l y  
t h e  c o v e r i n g  l a w ' s  narrow d e f i n i t i o n  o f  cause ,  n o t  o n l y  r i g h t l y  r e f u s e s  a method 
which e x c l u d e s  a  p l a c e  f o r  meaning, b u t  a l s o  d i s m i s s e s  a s  a  goa l  a l t o g e t h e r  any form 
of c a u s a l  e x p l a n a t i o n .  A s  I have t r i e d  t o  show e a r l i e r ,  however, t h e  e x p l i c i t  
r e f u s a l  of c a u s a l i t y  cannot  c o n t a i n  t h e  i m p l i c i t  "smuggling i n "  o f  a d  hoc--an t h u s  
unexamined--cause. Indeed it is a r g u a b l e  t h a t  none of t h e  t h r e e  modes a r e  c a p a b l e  of 
a c c o u n t i n g  f o r  sequence,  t e m p o r a l i t y ,  n a r r a t i v e  o r d e r i n g ,  and contingency--and s t i l l  
a d h e r e  t o  an e x p l a n a t o r y  g o a l .  I n  l i g h t  of t h i s  a p p a r e n t  s t a l e m a t e ,  l e t  us  once 
a g a i n  t u r n  t o  s c i e n c e ' s  h i s t o r i c  t u r n  i n  s e a r c h  o f  a  model f o r  t h e  c h a l l e n g e  t o  
c o n s t r u c t  an h i s t o r i c a l  ep i s temology  o f  n a r r a t i v e  c a u s a l i t y .  
Given t h e  c e n t r a l i t y  o f  h i s t o r y  f o r  Kuhn, it i s  s u r p r i s i n g  t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  h i s  
f o c u s  on h i s t o r y  concerned n o t  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  method i t s e l f  b u t  r a t h e r  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  
development o f  s c i e n c e  a s  a n  i n t e l l e c t u a l  endeavor .  H i s  work was t h u s  an  h i s t o r i c a l  
s o c i o l o g y  of t h o s e  c o n d i t i o n s  e n a b l i n g  s c i e n t i f i c  achievement  t o  be  s o  d e f i n e d .  T h i s  
s o c i o l o g i c a l  a s p e c t  o f  h i s  work was t h e  s o u r c e  o f  t h e  c h a r g e s  of i r r a t i o n a l i t y .  But 
f o r  Kuhn t h e  r a t i o n a l i t y o f  s c i e n t i f i c  method w a s  n e v e r  a t  i s s u e .  To be s u r e ,  
q u e s t i o n i n g  t h e  d i s r e t e n e s s  o f  f a c t  and t h e o r y  had s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  
methodology. But t h e s e  were  i s s u e s  o v e r  realism, n o t  o v e r  t h e  ep i s temology  o f  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  p e r  s e ,  and c e r t a i n l y  n o t  o v e r  t h e  h i s t o r i c i t y - - o r  l a c k  o f  i t - - i n  t h e  
e x p l a n a t o r y  p r o c e s s .  Indeed i n  a  l a t e r  l e c t u r e ,  " O b j e c t i v i t y ,  v a l u e  judgment, and 
t h e o r y  c h o i c e , "  Kuhn a f f i r m e d  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  method-- 
t h e o r i e s  s h o u l d  be  " a c c u r a t e ,  c o n s i s t e n t ,  broad i n  scope ,  s i m p l e ,  and f r u i t f u l  i n  new 
r e s e a r c h  f i n d i n g s . " 8 7  
The h i s t o r i c  t u r n  i n  s c i e n c e  t h u s  s h a r e d  t h i s  same l i m i t a t i o n  w i t h  t h a t  o f  
h i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g y .  They b o t h  s topped  s h o r t  o f  t a k i n g  on t h e  most i n t r a c t a b l e  
a s p e c t  of b o t h  s c i e n t i f i c  and s o c i a l  s c i e n t i f i c  assumptions--how t o  b u i l d  t h e  
con t ingency  o f  t e m p o r a l i t y  i n t o  t h e  a t t e m p t  t o  make s e n s e  o f  t h e  w o r l d ' s  
r e g u l a r i t i e s .  Without t h i s  s t e p ,  i n  b o t h  s c i e n c e  and s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  we a r e  l e f t  w i t h  
t h e  i d e a l  o f  judging what c o u n t s  a s  an  e x p l a n a t i o n  on t h e  b a s i s  of a  p r i o r i  s t a n d a r d s  
common a c r o s s  t h e  f i e l d s - - g e n e r a l i t y  and parsimony of c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  t h e  
r e d u c t i o n  of c a u s e  t o  a  s u b s e t  o f  p r e d i c t i v e  law, o r  t h e  a n t i h i s t o r i c i s m  o f  
d e d u c t i v i s t  l o g i c .  
A new h i s t o r i c  t u r n  --- 
What was l e f t  untouched by Kuhn remains b o t h  t h e  most o u t s t a n d i n g  c h a l l e n g e  t o  
and t h e  most n e g l e c t e d  concern  o f  p h i l o s o p h e r s  and s c i e n t i s t s .  But i n  t h e  l a s t  few 
y e a r s ,  a  glimmer o f  a  new h i s t o r i c  t u r n  i n  t h e  ep i s temology  of  s c i e n t i f i c  method 
i t s e l f  h a s  begun t o  emerge from a  c o r n e r  o f  ph i losophy  and s c i e n c e .  I t  is  glimmer 
t h a t  h a s  much t o  o f f e r  b o t h  t h e  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e s  and t h e  humani t i e s .  Most 
p rominen t ly ,  Nancy C a r t w r i g h t ,  Richard M i l l e r ,  and Stephen Gould have a l l  t o  g r e a t e r  
o r  l e s s e r  d e g r e e s  o f  e x p l i c i t n e s s  have r e j e c t e d  t h e  c o v e r i n g  law d e f i n i t i o n  of 
c a u s a l i t y  and t a k e n  up t h e  c h a l l e n g e  t o  de fend  t h e  h i s t o r i c i t y  of t h e  e x p l a n a t o r y  
p r o c e s s .  The keys tone  o f  t h e i r  argument is a  renewed--one cou ld  s a y  reclaimed-- 
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  c a u s e .  They i n s i s t  on t h e  a n a l y t i c  detachment  of c a u s e  from p r e d i c t i o n  
and law, and i n  s o  do ing ,  t h e y  have p rov ided  a  model f o r  h i s t o r i c i z i n g  s o c i a l  
e x p l a n a t i o n .  88 
I n  o r d e r  t o  h i g h l i g h t  t h e  n o v e l t y  of t h e i r  arguments ,  l e t ' s  look b r i e f l y  a t ' o u r  
e x i s t i n g  models o f  cause .  Take any h i s t o r i c a l  n a r r a t i v e  a b o u t  which we want t o  
e x p l a i n  a  p a t t e r n  o f  e v e n t s  a c r o s s  cases--say,  r e v o l u t i o n s .  The models w e  have now 
are 1) s e t t i n g  up  a  g e n e r a l  law of r e v o l u t i o n s  t h a t  a n a l y z e s  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  and 
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  a  r e v o l u t i o n  t o  happen. Tha t  means g i v e n  c ,  t h e n  when x .  
happens,  y  w i l l  f o l l o w .  The c a u s e  of t h e  French r e v o l u t i o n  i s  deduced from t h i s ,  
meaning t h a t  it had t o  happen. Wit.hin t h i s  t h e r e  a r e  2  ways a t  a r r i v i n g  a t  t h i s  law: 
a )  making i t  from a  d e d u c t i o n / p a r a l l e l ;  b )  i n d u c i n g  it. What is wrong w i t h  t h e s e  
approaches?  The f i r s t  problem is t h a t  t h e y  c a n ' t  accomodate what is  d i f f e r e n t  abou t  
t r y i n g  t o  unders tand  h i s t o r i c a l  e v e n t s  a s  opposed t o  e x p e r i m e n t a l  phenomenon. The 
r e v o l u t i o n s  o c c u r r e d  i n  a  p a r t i c u l a r  temporal  h i s t o r i c a l  sequence--they fol lowed o r  
were b u i l t  on an accumula t ion  of p a s t  e v e n t s .  The i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n a l  
v a r i a b l e s ,  however, s a y s  n o t h i n g  abou t  t h i s  sequence ;  t h e  n a r r a t i v i t y  o f  t h e  
phenomenon t o  be e x p l a i n e d  becomes r e s i d u a l  t o  t h e  s u p e r i o r  importance of t h e  s imple  
p r e s e n c e  o r  absence of c r u c i a l  v a r i a b l e s .  I n  Gould 's  p h r a s e ,  i t  assumes t h a t  i f  we 
" ran  t h e  t a p e  backwards ,"  a s  l o n g  a s  t h e  same v a r i a b l e s  e v e n t u a l l y  came t o g e t h e r ,  a  
r e v o l u t i o n  would happen.89 The reason  why t h e s e  u s e s  o f  c a u s a l i t y  can n o t  cope w i t h  
t h i s  c r u c i a l  a s p e c t  o f  n a r r a t i v i t y  and sequence h a s  t o  d o  w i t h  t h e  fundamental  
d e f i n i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  method--the n e c e s s i t y  f o r  g e n e r a l i t y  and f o r  c a u s e  t o  have a  
uniform l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  o u t s i d e  of any p a r t i c u l a r  c i r c u m s t a n c e  which would l i m i t  
i ts  a p p l i c a b i l i t y  o r  t e s t a b i l i t y . 9 0  
N a r r a t i v i t y  is exc luded  p r e c i s e l y  because  of i t s  n e c e s s a r y  con t ingency .  Andrew 
Abbott  h a s  shown t h i s  i n  an  a n a l y s i s  o f  "what do c a s e s  do" i n  s t a n d a r d  s o c i o l o g i c a l  
a n a l y s i s  u s i n g  p o s i t i v i s t  methodology.91 Taking a p a r t  a  few s t u d i e s ,  he demons t ra tes  
t h a t  t h e  t y p i c a l  s o c i o l o g i s t ' s  c a s e  b e g i n s  w i t h  "mere e x i s t e n c e "  and t h e n  is  
c o n s t r u c t e d  o u t  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  p r o p e r t i e s  a s s i g n e d  t o  i t  by t h e  i n v e s t i g a t o r - - t h i s  
is t r u e  whether  t h e  c a s e  is a  b i o l o g i c a l  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  a  s t a t e ,  f o r  example. He 
f i n d s  t h a t  i n  o r d e r  f o r  t h e  c a u s a l  v a r i a b l e  r e l a t i o n s  t o  h o l d  a c r o s s  c a s e s ,  a l l  t h e  
c a s e s  must f o l l o w  o n l y  one n a r r a t i v e  sequence (even i f  t h e y  i n  f a c t  d o n ' t ) .  Var iab le  
a n a l y s i s ,  i n  t h i s  model, t h u s  means s a c r i f i c i n g  t h e  n a r r a t i v e  o r d e r  on t h e  assumption 
t h a t  sequence and o r d e r  would n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  c a u s a l . e x p l a n a t i o n .  I n  A b b o t t ' s  words, 
" c a s e s  a r e  n o t  complex e n t i t i e s  whose c h a r a c t e r  is s i m p l i f i e d  i n  t h i s  model, b u t  
c h a r a c t e r l e s s  e n t i t i e s  ' c o m p l e x i f i e d '  ( ! ? I  by t h e  v a r i a b l e  t h a t  a s s i g n  p r o p e r t i e s  t o  
them.IS92 I n  one h i s t o r i c a l  s t u d y ,  t h e  s o c i o l o g i s t  t a k e s  t h e  s t o r i e s  of how workmen's 
compensation developed i n  48 s t a t e s  i n  t h e  U S ,  and t r a n s f o r m s  t h e s e  48 n a r r a t i v e s  
i n t o  960 independent ,  one-s tep  n a r r a t i v e s  by a n a l y z i n g  e a c h  s ta te ' s  p r o c e s s  of 
d e v e l o p i n g  t h e  p o l i c y  a t  20  d i f f e r e n t  t ime p e r i o d s .  T h i s  means t h a t  what f o r  an 
h i s t o r i c a l  c a s e  is  t h e  s t a t e  o f  Massachuse t t s  i n  t h e  y e a r s  1912, 1913, 1914 f o r  
example is  t r e a t e d  by t h i s  h i s t o r i c a l  s o c i o l o g i s t  a s  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  cases--  
Massachuse t t s  i n  1912 i s  one c a s e ,  Massachuse t t s  i n  1913 a n o t h e r ,  and s o  on. 
C o n t r a s t  t h i s  w i t h  an h i s t o r i a n ' s  d i s c o u r s e  i n  which a  c a s e  is  d e f i n e d  n o t  j u s t  by 
geography b u t  e q u a l l y  by t e m p o r a l i t y .  For t h e  s o c i o l o g i s t ,  however, t h a t  any g iven  
e v e n t  was c o n s t i t u t i v e l y  connected t o  t h e  p a s t  e v e n t s  on which i ts  v e r y  e x i s t e n c e  
depended o r  was c o n t i n g e n t  is e x t r a n e o u s  t o  t h e  s c i e n t i f i c  method. 
An a d d i t i o n a l  f e a t u r e  of t h e  way t h a t  p o s i t i v i s t  a n a l y s i s  d e a l s  w i t h  an  
h i s t o r i c a l  c a s e  i s  t o  f o r c e  it i n t o  stasis; s o c i a l  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  some s o r t  may be 
t h e  o b j e c t  o f  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  b u t  t h e  e x p l a n a t o r y  p r o c e s s  c o n s i s t s  i n  a s s i g n i n g  
enduring--and n o t  chang ing- -var iab les  t o  t h e  c a s e .  C o n t r a s t  t h i s  w i t h  an h i s t o r i c a l  
c a s e  i n  which,  a s  Abbot t  p o i n t s  o u t ,  a  c a s e  which began a s  one c a t e g o r y  may end u p  
b e i n g  a n  i n s t a n c e  o f  a n o t h e r :  a  s t a t e  becomes a n a t i o n ,  a  c r a f t  becomes a  p r o f e s s i o n ,  
and s o  on.93 Refus ing  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  c a s e  i t s e l f - - a s  opposed t o  b e i n g  t h e  
o b j e c t  o f  e x p l a n a t i o n - - i s  a n o t h e r  a s p e c t  o f  t h e  i n c a p a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  p o s i t i v i s t  
approach a c c o u n t i n g  f o r  con t ingency .  
The problem we a r e  f a c i n g  i s  how t o  b r i n g  h i s t o r i c i t y  i n t o  t h e  method i t s e l f .  
What would we want from a  c a u s a l  e x p l a n a t i o n  a f t e r  t h e  h i s t o r i c  t u r n ?  To g e t  a t  what 
we would want and need from an  a d e q u a t e  h i s t o r i c a l  method e n t a i l s  i n v e r t i n g  many of  
t h e  problems w e  have i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  n o n - h i s t o r i c a l  one.  We would want a  method 
t h a t  can i d e n t i f y  c a u s e  and a t  t h e  same t i m e  account  f o r  sequence,  n a r r a t i v e ,  and 
con t ingency  o f  h i s t o r y .  It would be  a  method would would s t e p  o u t  o f  t h e  dichotomy 
between c a u s e  and m e a n i n g - - i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  meaning can be a  c a u s e  and t h a t  c a u s e  can  
be meaningful .  And it would have t o  be a  method which a l s o  r e f u s e d  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  
t h e  e i t h e r / o r  o f  g e n e r a l  c o v e r i n g  l a w  v e r s u s  " j u s t  random h i s t o r y . "  For t h e  i s s u e  
i s n ' t  d e g r e e s  of g e n e r a l i t y  o r  s t o r y - t e l l i n g ,  b u t  whether  a  meaningful  e x p l a n a t i o n  
can be  found. With t h e s e  c r i t e r i a  s o  d i s t i n c t  from t h o s e  of t h e  c o v e r i n g  law 
p o s i t i o n ,  we might  a l s o  assume t h a t  t h e  means o f  a c h i e v i n g  them would a l s o  be q u i t e  
t h e  o p p o s i t e  from t h o s e  o f  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  model. T h i s  is indeed  t h e  c a s e .  W e  would 
want t o  s e p a r a t e  c a u s e  from law; it  is t h e  c o n f l a t i o n  of t h e  two t h a t  h a s  made c a u s e  
s o  a n t i t h e t i c a l  t o  t h o s e  who would p u r s u e  h i s t o r i c i t y  and meaning. Making t h i s  
s e p a r a t i o n  w i l l  a l l o w  u s  t o  s e e  t h a t  from a  d i f f e r e n t  a n g l e  c a u s a l i t y  is i n h e r e n t l y  
n a r r a t i v e  and h i s t o r i c a l ;  it can a c c o u n t  f o r  p a t t e r n s  t h a t  n o n e t h e l e s s  e x i s t  w i t h i n  
f rames o f  con t ingency  and i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  
C a u s a l i t y  a f t e r  t h e  h i s t o r i c  t u r n  would f i r s t  and fo remos t  g a i n  autonomy from 
any a  p r i o r i  l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e ,  and from c o n d i t i o n a l  p r o p o s i t i o n s  and p r e d i c t i o n .  I n  
t h e  absence  of t h i s  a  p r i o r i  l o g i c ,  R ichard  M i l l e r  s p e c i f i c a l l y  s u g g e s t s  t h e  n o t i o n  
o f  a  "core  c o n c e p t i o n "  which c o n t a i n s  some v a r i e t i e s  o f  c l a s s e s  t h a t  coun t  a s  c a u s e s ,  
b u t  which, l i k e  a  work o f  a r t ,  can be ex tended  th rough  i n t e r m e d i a t e  cases .94  An 
a d e q u a t e  c a u s a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  is n o t  a  p r i o r i  b u t  e m p i r i c a l  and v a r i e s  depending on 
c o n t e x t  and s u b j e c t  m a t t e r ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  a c t u a l  s t a t e  o f  knowledge abou t  t h a t  
s u b j e c t .  T h a t  a l t e r n a t i v e  can be  found i n  Gould 's  n o t i o n  of con t ingency  a s  t h e  
e s s e n c e  of h i s t o r y ;  i n  M i l l e r ' s  n o t i o n  o f  c a u s a l i t y  a s  h i s t o r i c a l ,  compara t ive ,  and 
a n t i - g e n e r a l ;  i n  A b b o t t ' s  n o t i o n  o f  g e n e r a l i z e d  n a r r a t i v e ;  o r  C a r t w r i g h t ' s  n o t i o n  o f  
c a u s a l  s t o r i e s .  Each o f  t h e s e  r e p r e s e n t s  d i f f e r e n t  a n g l e s  t o  g e t  o u t s i d e  t h e  
dichotomous b i n d  o f  de te rmin i sm,  a  p r i o r i  g e n e r a l  l o g i c ,  c a u s e  as a  s u b s e t  o f  
p r e d i c t i o n  on end o f  t h e , d i c h o t o m y ;  w i t h  randomness, p a r t i c u l a r i s m ,  non-causal  chance 
e v e n t s  on t h e  o t h e r .  By c o n t r a s t ,  t h e y  e a c h  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  argument t h a t  meaningful  
c a u s e  can be d e t e c t e d ,  and meaningful  p a t t e r n s  can be e x p l a i n e d ,  b u t  t h a t  outcomes 
c a n n o t  be p r e d i c t e d  from e x p l a n a t i o n s .  Each s t e p  of t h e  p a t t e r n  "proceeds  f o r  
cause" ,  b u t  no f i n a l e  is  p r e - p a t t e r n e d  i n t o  t h a t  c a u s e ;  a  change i n  an  e a r l y  e v e n t  
w i l l  p roduce  a  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n  o f  sequence.  
Cons ider  Gould ' s  e v o l u t i o n a r y  t h e o r y  a s  a n  exemplar.  He e s t a b l i s h e s  a  t h e o r y ,  
n o t  j u s t  a  s t o . r y ,  of e v o l u t i o n , ' b y  b e i n g  a b l e  t o  show t h a t  i f  n o t  f o r  h i s  account  o f  
c a u s a l  r e p e r t o i r e ,  sequence ,  l i f e  a s  w e  know it would have t u r n e d  o u t  d i f f e r e n t l y .  
A s  h e  d e m o n s t r a t e s  p o e t i c a l l y  i n  h i s  g r i p p i n g  s t o r y  of t h e  Burgess S h a l e ,  t h i s  " t h i r d  
way" between de te rmin i sm and randomness is r e a l l y  what h i s t o r i c a l  c a u s a l i t y  is a l l  
about- -cont ingency.  Cont ingency,  he i n s i s t s  "is a  t h i n g  u n t o  i t s e l f ,  n o t  t h e  
t i t r a t i o n  of de te rmin i sm by randomness."95 Cont ingency means t h e  accumulat ion of t h e  
p a s t  is  a  p r e c o n d i t i o n  f o r  any moment i n  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  and t h u s  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  make 
s e n s e  a n a l y t i c a l l y  o f  t h e  r e s u l t ,  i n  comparat ive  t e rms .  But it a l s o  means a c c e p t i n g  
t h a t  i f  t h e  r e s u l t s  a r e  t r u l y  c o n t i n g e n t  on t h e  p a s t ,  t h e n  an a l t e r a t i o n  i n  one o f  
t h o s e  e v e n t s  w i l l  change t h i n g s .  T h i s  is n o t  a n t i - s t r u c t u r a l ;  he  is  n o t  s u g g e s t i n g  
they  - have t o  change t h i n g s .  The c l a s s i c  example is  t h e  American C i v i l  War: change 
t h e  m i l i t a r y  s t r a t e g y  and t h e  North s t i l l  would have won because  of s u p e r i o r  
p o p u l a t i o n  and r e s o u r c e s .  S t r u c t u r e s  a r e  p a r t  o f  t h e  c o n t i n g e n t  s t o r y .  
But l e t  me look  a  b i t  more c l o s e l y  a t  how e v o l u t i o n a r y  t h e o r y ,  Marx i s t  t h e o r y ,  
and F r e u d i a n  t h e o r y  cou ld  be  s e e n  from t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e .  E v o l u t i o n a r y  t h e o r y  h a s  
l o n g  been exc luded  from t h e  "hard s c i e n c e s "  by v i r t u r e  o f  i t s  n a r r a t i v e  s t r u c t u r e .  
To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  was i n c l u d e d  a t  a l l ,  it w a s  due  t o  t h e  long-accepted a t t e m p t  t o  
l o c a t e  e v o l u t i o n a r y  e x p l a n a t i o n  w i t h i n  t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  d i r e c t  p r e d i c t a b i l i t y ,  
de te rmin i sm,  and i n v a r i a n t  laws o f  n a t u r e . 9 6  T h i s  produced t h e  well-known t e l e o l o g i c  
l a d d e r  o f  e v o l u t i o n  w i t h  which we a r e  a l l  f a m i l i a r .  Gould t u r n s  t h i s  s t o r y  on i t s  
head.  H e  t e l l s  t h e  s t o r y  o f  t h e  Burgess s h a l e  which ev idenced  hundreds  of d i f f e r e n t  
s p e c i e s ,  o n l y  two o f  which a r e  w i t h  u s  today .  Through compara t ive  h i s t o r i c a l  
a n a l y s i s ,  Gould i s  a b l e  t o  r u l e  o u t  t h e  s t a n d a r d  c a u s a l  e x p l a n a t i o n  a b o u t  t h e  
s u r v i v a l  o f  t h e  f i t t e s t  and t o  i n s t e a d  i d e n t i f y  "decimat ion"  o f  many of  t h e  v e r y  
f i t t e s t  s p e c i e s ,  l e a v i n g  o n l y  t h e  puny and weak ones .  Through a  l o n g  s t o r y  of c a u s e  
and e f f e c t ,  he weaves t o g e t h e r  a  new t h e o r y  o f  evo lu t , ion  t h a t  t u r n s  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
l a d d e r s  and cones  of o u r  e v o l u t i o n a r y  iconography on t h e i r  heads ,  o n l y  t o  r e v e a l  an 
e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  p a t t e r n .  
Gould 's  e x p l a n a t i o n  is  r o o t e d  i n  con t ingency .  It is  n o t  guaran teed  by b a s i c  
laws of n a t u r a l  s e l e c t i o n ,  mechanical  s u p e r i o r i t y  i n  a n a t o m i c a l  d e s i g n ,  o r  even by 
l o w e r - l e v e l  g e n e r a l i t i e s  o f  eco logy  o r  e v o l u t i o n a r y  t h e o r y .  The absence of law, 
however, d o e s  n o t  p r e c l u d e  t h e  r e c o v e r a b i l i t y  o f  c a u s e  th rough  t h e  method o f  
comparison--or what Gould c a l l s  " r e p l a y i n g  t h e  t a p e . "  " T e s t a b i l i t y "  is sti l l  h i s  
requ i rement  f o r  c a u s a l  a t t r i b u t i o n ,  and he st i l l  b e l i e v e s  i n  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
d i s c o v e r i n g  whether  hypotheses  a r e  d e f i n i t e l y  wrong o r  p r o b a b l y  c o r r e c t .  Using t h e  
n o t i o n  o f  "consi1ience"-- the  "conspir ing1* o f  many independen t  s o u r c e s  t o  i n d i c a t e  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  h i s t o r i c a l  pat tern--Gould a d v o c a t e s  compara t ive  n a r r a t i v i t y  (my te rm)  a s  
t h e  method f o r  d e t e r m i n i n g  h i s t o r i c a l  c a u s a l i t y .  H i s t o r i c a l  e x p l a n a t i o n s  must t a k e  
t h e  form of  n a r r a t i v e s :  Y happened because  X happened b e f o r e  it  preceded by A,B, and 
C. The key s t e p  is t h e  f o l l o w i n g  comparat ive  t es t :  i f  any  o f  t h e s e  e a r l i e r  s t a g e s  
had n o t  o c c u r r e d ,  o r  had developed d i f f e r e n t ,  t h e n  Y would n o t  e i t h e r  have happened 
a t  a l l  o r  would be  s o  d i f f e r e n t  i n  form t h a t  a  d i f f e r e n t  e x p l a n a t i o n  would b e  
n e c e s s a r y .  T h i s  method shows t h a t  Y makes s e n s e  and can be  e x p l a i n e d  " r i g o r o u s l y "  a s  
t h e  outcome o f  t h e  c a u s a l  p r o c e s s  o f  A thorugh  C p l u s  X. But "no law of n a t u r e  
e n j o i n e d "  t h i s  outcome Y ;  and any  v a r i a n t  o f  Y emerging from d i f f e r e n t l y  c o n f i g u r e d  
a n t e c e d e n t s  would "have been e q u a l l y  e x p l i c a b l e ,  though m a s s i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  i n  form 
and e f f e c t . " 9 7  
T h i s  c a u a l  e x p l a n a t i o n  t h u s  i n c l u d e s  o u r  c r u c i a l  c r i t e r i a :  n a r r a t i v i t y  and 
a t t e n t i o n  t o  o r d e r  and sequence,  con t ingency ,  and c a u s a l  i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y .  The 
c e n t e r p i e c e  is t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  h i s t o r i c a l  e x p l a n a t i o n  is  c o n t i n g e n t  upon an  
u n p r e d i c t a b l e  sequence o f  a n t e c e d e n t s  states where changes  i n  t h e  sequence would 
a l t e r  t h e  r e s u l t s .  The r e s u l t  is t h u s  dependen t - - tha t  is contingent--UPON e v e r y t h i n g  
t h a t  came b e f o r e ,  n o t  a  d e d u c i b l e  consequence from a law o f  n a t u r e  o r  even 
p r e d i c t a b l e  from a  g e n e r a l  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  l a r g e r  sys tem.98 
A d i f f e r e n t  example t h a t  n o n e t h e l e s s  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  n o t i o n  of 
c a u s a l i t y  is taken  from p s y c h o a n a l y t i c  t h e o r y .  From t h e  classic d e d u c t i v i s t  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  c a u s e ,  F r e u d ' s  t h e o r y  o f  c h a r a c t e r  d o e s  not i n  f a c t  q u a l i f y  as a t h e o r y  
s i n c e  t h e  t h e o r y  p r o v i d e s  no p remises  f o r  d e d u c i n g  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  a  p e r s o n ' s  emot iona l  
l i f e :  whether pathology develops i n  an ind iv idua l  is a r e s u l t  of a convergence of 
f a c t o r s ,  and t h e i r  n a r r a t i v e  sequence, inc luding pathologica l  tendences and ego 
s t r e n g t h ,  f o r  which t h e r e  is no psychoanalyt ic  formula. What t h e r e  is  i n  Freud 's  
theory,  by c o n t r a s t ,  is  what Mi l l e r  c a l l s  "a r e p e r t o i r e  of causa l  mechanisms" f o r  use 
i n  the  explanat ion  of a d u l t  cha rac te r .  Two of these  would be t h e  capac i ty  t o  cope 
and t h e  be emotionally open a r e  shaped by unconscious d e s i r e s  and thoughts  which 
develop i n  childhood; and t h a t  these  childhood d e s i r e s  a r e  t h e  most important source 
of psychic pa in  and impulsive o r  i n f l e x i b l e  behavior. I t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  the  range of 
poss ib le  sequels  t h a t  excludes the  theory from the  s t a t u s  of " theory" i n  the  
d e d u c t i v i s t  mode. Indeed while some deductive p r i n c i p l e s  could be ex t rac ted  from t h e  
theory,  they a r e  the  l e a s t  important a spec t s  of any vers ion  of psychonalyt ic  theory.  
The requirement t h a t  premises f o r  deduct ive  explanat ion  a r e  necessary t o  a t t r i b u t e  
t h e o r e t i c a l  s t a t u s  has had poor e f f e c t s  on the  theory,  leading advocates t o  i n s i s t  
t h a t  a v a r i e t y  of deduct ive  premises must be accepted t o  accept  t h e  theory  a t  a11.99 
A s i m i l a r  e x e r c i s e  could be performed on Marxism. It a l s o  would no t  q u a l i f y  a s  
a proper theory  given i t s  absence of appropr ia te  deductive premises. Although t h e  
theory provides a t e s t a b l e  causa l  reper to i re- - the  causes of bas ic  i n t e r n a l  change l i e  
i n  t h e  o l d  mode of m a t r i a l  production and t h e  i n t e r e s t s  and resources  it creates--  
these  a r e  not  t e s t a b l e  premises f o r  deductions.  Meanwhile, t h e r e  i s  a premise t h a t  
has been awarded the  d e d u c t i v i s t  a t t r i b u t i o n  of theory--that  of technologica l  
determinism. One of the  more i n t e r e s t i n g  aspec t s  of Marxology i s  t h a t  t h e  
phi losophers  i n  sea rch  of  a proper theory,  have tended t o  de f ine  Marxism i n  terms of 
e i t h e r  such technologica l  determinism o r ,  more recen t ly ,  r a t i o n a l  choice. By 
c o n t r a s t ,  t hese  deba tes  over  Marx's genera l  theory  of h i s t o r y  a r e  f a i r l y  u s e l e s s  t o  
even Marxist h i s t o r i a n s  who employ h i s t o r i c a l  explanat ions  v i r t u a l l y  everyone would 
agr ree  t o  be Marxist,  and whose arguments v i r t u a l l y  everyone would see  a s  ins tances  
of Marxist theory ,  bu t  t h e  c h a r a c t e r  of which excludes them of i n t e r e s t  t o  those who 
would d e f i n e  theory.lOO 
What a l l  of these  t h e o r i e s  sha re  is a concept of cause and a concomitant concept 
of theory  t h a t  i s  shaped by an h i s t o r i c a l  epistemology. The moral of t h i s  s t o r y  i s  
t h a t  i n  sc ience  a s  we l l  a s  sociology and h i s t o r y  an explanat ion  which a c t u a l l y  
d e p i c t s  causal  mechanisms is  always t o l d  i n  n a r r a t i v e  form. I t  is a s e t  of sentences 
with t r a n s i t i v e  verbs.  Cause impl ies  n a r r a t i v e .  The h i s t o r i c a l  and temporal 
dimension of comparative h i s t o r y  is  thus  a s  important a s  i ts comparative component 
. f o r  i t  e n t a i l s  explantory  n a r r a t i v e .  It  is n a r r a t i v e  because t h e  explant ion  is  
embedded i n  time, and moves through time. Indeed t h e  success  of any explanat ion  
r e s i d e s  i n  its accounting f o r  temporal i ty  and sequence. 
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